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HOW IS COMPETITION POLICY COPING WITH
ATLANTIC AREA AIRLINE MARKETS?
Daniel J. Gifford*
Robert T. Kudrle**
2018 MICH. ST. L. REV. 619
ABSTRACT
Concentration in airline markets in both the U.S. and the EU is very
high and has been for decades. Competition authorities on both sides
of the Atlantic have nonetheless approved mergers and alliances that
appear to increase the market power of the participating firms. How
effective is domestic and international airline competition in the
Atlantic area today, and how effective is prevailing competition
policy? Is policy conflict likely? These questions are explored in the
context of a major industry that has historically been more nationally
protected and controlled than perhaps any other outside of the defense
sector. Is the industry’s performance likely to improve or diminish?
We recently concluded a comprehensive study of U.S. and EU
competition policies, The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, which stresses
critical differences between the two policy regimes as well as some
similarities. As industries increasingly globalize, coordination of
competition policies becomes ever more important, and the potential
for conflict—the extraterritorial veto power national authorities have
over foreign practices that affect the home market—cannot be
ignored. We conclude that, despite some very different underlying
assumptions and enforcement systems, competition authorities on
both sides of the Atlantic appear to have developed a similar and
compatible approach to the airlines that may lead to improved social
performance without serious policy conflict
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INTRODUCTION
The American airline industry has seen a substantial increase in
overall concentration in the last decade as six legacy carriers have
been replaced by three.1 Today, the United States (U.S.) domestic
market is dominated by the three remaining legacy carriers (Delta,
United, and American) and Southwest, a so-called low-cost carrier.
Much of the single-market European Union (EU) is dominated by
firms that are allied with one or more of the three U.S. legacy carriers.
Most airline routes on both sides of the Atlantic are above the level
regarded as “highly concentrated” in the language of the U.S. merger

1. This paper focuses on the U.S. and the EU. Canadian developments are
interesting in their own right but doing them justice would require more institutional
discussion than space permits.
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guidelines. North America and the EU together account for between
50–60% of global aviation,2 although this share is declining.3
Does the present level of concentration in the U.S. domestic and
transatlantic markets mean, as some have argued, that effective
competition has diminished significantly over recent years, and that
the airline industry is likely to demonstrate increasingly
anticompetitive behavior and increasingly poor performance both
within each region and between them? Is consumer welfare,
accordingly, likely to fall? Can the competition policy regimes in the
U.S. and the EU promote an effective degree of competition by
pursuing only the conventional objectives of controlling concentration
and entry barriers, or are there alternative ways of fostering
competitive results? Heavy government regulation was a hallmark of
the industry’s early history with markedly negative results, so if new
regulation is considered, it would need to be dramatically different
from anything yet seen. Do the new phenomena of alliances among
international carriers presage lower costs, increased volume, and
lower fares, or do they signal the opposites? These are some of the
questions addressed in this Article. Our interest in the subject grows
directly from our consideration of U.S. and EU competition policy in
The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust, where we emphasized differences
rather than similarities in policy regimes.4
The airline industry displays uniqueness in many dimensions. It
has included an inevitable international component since its earliest
2. See INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., PRESENTATION OF 2016 AIR TRANSPORT
STATISTICAL
RESULTS
4
(2016),
https://www.icao.int/annual-report2016/Documents/ARC_2016_Air%20Transport%20Statistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/38QE-KRKB]; see also Guillaume Burghouwt, et al., EU Air
Transport Liberalisation Process, Impacts and Future Considerations 38 (Int’l
Transp. Forum, Discussion Paper 2015), https://www.itf-oecd.org/sites/default/
files/docs/dp201504.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZPX-RM4K]. The percentage depends on
whether activity is measured by value or physical units. See INT’L CIVIL AVIATION
ORG., supra note 1, at 4. The value number is higher. See id.
3. The horizontal merger guidelines of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) classify market concentration using the
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). The three categories used in the guidelines are:
unconcentrated (HHI below 1500), moderately concentrated (HHI between 1500 and
2500), or highly concentrated (HHI above 2500). U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 18 (2010), https://www.justice.gov/
sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RX6XVWF]. Concentration levels in the U.S. are discussed in Daniel J. Gifford & Robert
T. Kudrle, U.S. Airliners and Antitrust: The Struggle for Defensible Policy Towards
a Unique Industry, 50 IND. L. REV. 539, 539-41 (2017). The U.S. and EU alliance
structure is discussed infra in Section III.C of this Article.
4. See DANIEL J. GIFFORD & ROBERT T. KUDRLE, THE ATLANTIC DIVIDE IN
ANTITRUST: AN EXAMINATION IN US AND EU COMPETITION POLICY 1 (2015).
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days, yet much of it remains partially protected by nationally specific
regulations that severely limit foreign participation in routes and
ownership.5 In antitrust analysis, city-pairs (a route between two
cities) are generally treated as the most relevant markets. In most
countries, city-pairs are more concentrated than the overall level of
concentration. In the U.S. today, concentration levels in many citypair markets would be classified as highly concentrated under the
merger guidelines: Dallas/Chicago: HHI 3031; Denver/Philadelphia:
HHI 3397; and Los Angeles/Boston: HHI 2595.6 The merger
guidelines regard all markets bearing an HHI index of 2500 or more
(as all of these markets do) as highly concentrated.7 And in Europe the
city-pair concentration is typically much higher.8 But despite
concentration indicia suggesting market power, the major carriers on
both sides of the Atlantic until recently have had a dismal profit
history.9 In nearly every national market, the major carriers have
experienced chronic losses, often leading to bankruptcy and merger or
exit.10
The secular growth of air travel has been far higher than GDP
growth rates in most markets, yet the intertemporal variation in output
has been very high, contributing largely to the observed profitability
problems.11 Finally, the connection between air transport and public

5. See the discussion of the Chicago Convention and its ramifications in
Part III infra.
6. The Herfindahl index is the sum of squared market shares of all firms,
where (here) a 0.25 share is treated as 25. Authors’ calculations from firm data. See
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 19.
7. Id.
8. See William M. Swan, Consolidation in the Airline Industry, available at
cyberswans.com/AirlineIndustryPubs/Consolidation/ConsolidationPaper.doc
[https://perma.cc/49D4-4RSQ ] (Swan is a Boeing economist).
9. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 543. On the financial condition of
European airlines, see Alex Dichter, Sybren Hahn & Dominic Maxwell, Winter is
Coming: The Future of European Aviation and How to Survive It (2015), available at
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/travel-transport-and-logistics/ourinsights/winter-is-coming-the-future-of-european-aviation-and-how-to-survive-it.
The authors note that, since 1985, aviation has averaged €13 billion per year of
economic loss. Id. at 7.
10. See List of Airline Bankruptcies in the United States, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_airline_bankruptcies_in_the_United_States
https://perma.cc/2TQM-Y8MZ]; List of Defunct Airlines of Europe, WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_defunct_airlines_of_Europe
[https://perma.cc/HKY8-6RSZ].
11. See AIRBUS, GLOBAL MARKET FORECAST: GROWING HORIZONS 7 (2017),
http://airbus-dev63.adobecqms.net/aircraft/market/global-market-forecast.html
[https://perma.cc/6SX9-8LUS]; INT’L AIR TRANSP. ASSOC., ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
OF THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 1 (2017), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/
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policy is more multifaceted than in almost other industry: The
combination of publicly controlled or regulated complementary
facilities such as airports, equipment safety, emergency financial
bailouts, personnel certification, and airline security are unique to this
industry.12
This study looks at the past, present, and future of air passenger
service in the U.S. and the EU with some attention to the place of the
Atlantic region in the larger global market. This focus is justified
because carriers based in the North America and the EU currently
carry over half of all global traffic.13 Yet these carriers’ fortunes turn
in part on the entire global market. In 2016, 40.9% of all air traffic
crossed international borders, and this percentage goes up more than
6% per year.14 Our central question stems directly from the law and
economics literature: How viable is competition in the Atlantic area
airline industry today?
I. AIRLINES: BRIEF HISTORY AND MAJOR CHARACTERISTICS
Unlike the case of many modern markets, global trade in air
services has not just evolved with the decline of general trade
protection and the development of technology15 but has been
continually affected by significant legal constraints.16 All international
air traffic stems from explicit bilateral agreements.17 The U.S.
dominated the world commercially as well as militarily as World War
II ended, and fear that such domination in air service would crush nonU.S. national carriers led to a highly restrictive regime announced at
the Chicago Conference of 1944.18 Each state maintained complete
control over its own airspace, and any foreign activity needed approval
by formal agreement.19 This eventually led to over 3,000 such
economics/IATA-Economic-Performance-of-the-Industry-mid-year-2017-report.pdf.
[https://perma.cc/G9EU-TZB4]
12. See Kenneth Button, The Usefulness of Current International Air
Transport Statistics, 2 J. TRANSP. & STAT. 71, 84 (1999).
13. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., supra note 2, at 4.
14. Id.
15. See KEN BUTTON, THE IMPACTS OF GLOBALISATION ON INTERNATIONAL
AIR TRANSPORT ACTIVITY: PAST TRENDS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 8-9 (2008),
https://www.oecd.org/greengrowth/greening-transport/41373470.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XAE8-3Z6U].
16. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 35.
17. See id. at 44.
18. See Kenneth Button, The Impact of US–EU “Open Skies” Agreement on
Airline Market Structures and Airline Networks, 15 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 59, 60
(2009).
19. See id.
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agreements, which typically stipulated the names of specific carriers,
the conditions of their ownership, and the nature of permission by
flight frequency and airports. National governments outside of the
U.S. typically owned their own monopoly “flag carriers.”20 Although
there are exceptions, outside of the EU, only a handful of states permit
foreign ownership of national airlines to exceed 50%, even today.21
(The EU is a special case in which the Union has effectively succeeded
to the rights of each of its member states.)22 This caution reflects
national security and safety concerns, but it also prevents nationals
from a third state from benefiting from existing bilateral agreements
if an airline were to change hands.23
The post-war developments of American and European based
airlines differ in one major respect: While the increased use of the
market mechanism for air travel in Europe has accompanied
widespread privatization since around 1980, U.S. airlines were private
throughout.24 Those changes in Europe were elements of the broader
melding of the European economies. By 1997, national restrictions on
intra-EU airline activity were no longer permitted, i.e., a Paris-based
carrier had the same rights in Germany as one based in Berlin.25
Non-negligible air travel before the Second World War outside
of North America and Europe was mainly in Australia, Japan, and
Latin America. These areas account for only a minor share of carriers
and traffic today. Instead, new airlines based in Taiwan, China,
Singapore, and the Gulf have become major factors in the global
marketplace. Emirates is now the fourth largest airline by scheduled
passenger miles flown and China Southern the eighth 26 This rise has
been driven by a combination of local entrepreneurship, protection,
and increasing regional demand.27 Whereas North America and
Europe accounted for 63% of all air traffic in 1995,28 this dropped to
53% by 2016.29
20. See id. at 63.
21. See id. at 63-64.
22. The Union requires all member states to afford equal protections to all
member states. Within the EU, therefore, airlines registered in any EU state must be
treated by each member state as a domestic airline.
23. See Button, supra note 18, at 63, 70.
24. See id. at 62.
25. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 14.
26. See Flight Global, World Airline Rankings 2017, 6 (2017),
https://www.flightglobal.com/asset/18223 [https://perma.cc/R7KN-MZG3].
27. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 42.
28. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., Annual Report of the Council 1995 1, 2
(1995), https://www.icao.int/Documents/annual-reports/rp95_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/HNU4-WU9Q]
29. INT’L CIVIL AVIATION ORG., supra note 2, at 4.

How is Competition Policy Coping?

625

II. AIRLINES AS AN INDUSTRY
A. Airline Costs
The regulation and national ownership of airlines were originally
linked to national security and safety.30 Safety concerns underlie part
of the extraordinary volume of data collected about virtually every
aspect of the airline industry worldwide. In the U.S. and in many other
jurisdictions, this includes cost data from individual carriers that are
unusually accurate and detailed.
A major concern about the airline industry at the time that the
U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board began its regulation of fares and routes
in 1938 was the possibility that the industry might suffer from a
tendency towards “destructive competition” due to high fixed costs
and low marginal costs.31 High fixed costs are especially problematic
for an industry such as air transport, which is subject to wide variations
in demand.32 Although some writers have taken this approach,33
Borenstein and Rose have pointed out that the industry is in fact not
unusual in its capital intensity.34 Rather, they have contended that its
vicissitudes historically stemmed from a confluence of erratic fuel
costs and huge swings in final demand interacting with dubious
business models by major firms that for decades typically implied
route expansion in good times and huge losses in downturns.35
The relation of service volume to costs has been studied from
many perspectives. One is the load factor: How close to passenger
capacity does a plane fly? In the U.S., the average number moved from
around 50% at the dawn of deregulation to 84.1% in 2017.36 In Europe,
load factors with increasing liberalization similarly moved to about
30.
31.

See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 36.
See JAMES J. LYNCH, AIRLINE ORGANIZATION IN THE 1980S: AN INDUSTRY
REPORT ON STRATEGIES AND STRUCTURES FOR COPING WITH CHANGE 65-66 (1984)
(urging enactment of regulatory legislation over the airline industry to “prevent the
spread of bad practices and of destructive and wasteful tactics resulting from the
intense competition now existing within the air-carrier industry”); Roger G. Noll,
Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 1254, 1257 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 1989).
32. See ELDAD BEN-YOSEF, THE EVOLUTION OF THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY:
THEORY, STRATEGY AND POLICY 106 (2005).
33. See id.
34. See Severin Borenstein & Nancy L. Rose, How Airline Markets Work . . .
or Do They? Regulatory Reform in the Airline Industry, in ECONOMIC REGULATION
AND ITS REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 63, 105-06 (Nancy L. Rose ed. 2014).
35. See id. at 112-14.
36. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 2017 Semi-Annual and June U.S. Airline Traffic
Data, https://www.bts.gov/newsroom/2017-semi-annual-and-june-us-airline-trafficdata [https://perma.cc/8M4R-WVUZ].
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the same level as the U.S. in recent years.37 Holding the load factor
and route structure constant, cost declines due to a larger aircraft or
closer seating are elements of economies of density.38 Savings from
the greater density achieved by substituting larger aircraft for smaller
aircraft dwarf savings from scale economies attained by extending a
given flight to a more distant destination.39 Costs can drop by 15%
with a doubling of passengers throughout, while economies of scale
gained from simply increasing destinations without a change in
density are minor.40
In the U.S., low-cost carriers (LCCs) have traditionally been
distinguished from “legacy” carriers.41 The legacy carriers are those
that were operating under the supervision of the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) during the regulatory period from 1938 to 1978.42 These
terms (“low cost” and “legacy”) suggest that the cost advantage that
the later-entering LCCs have had over the legacy carriers is a result of
the high labor cost structure that the legacies developed during the
regulatory period. This cost advantage is narrowing, however, nearly
all of the legacies have gone through Chapter 11 bankruptcy since the
beginning of the new century with the resulting institution of major
changes in labor practices.43
The hub-and-spoke structure of the legacy carriers
unanticipatedly emerged after deregulation as an efficient way to serve
the large number of medium-size cities that are core markets for the
legacies.44 Under a hub-and-spoke system, passengers are gathered at
hubs, enabling most of their trip to be carried out by large aircraft,
thereby increasing economies of density.45 For any given non-hub
origin and initial hub, the total journey cost declines with the distance
to a second destination hub.
37. See IATA, Strong Passenger Demand, Record Load Factor in February
(Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2017-04-06-01.aspx.
38. See Douglas W. Caves, Laurits R. Christensen & Michael W. Tretheway,
Economies of Density Versus Economies of Scale: Why Trunk and Local Service
Airline Costs Differ, 15 RAND J. ECON. 471, 474 (1984).
39. See id.
40. See id.; see also BIJAN VASIGH, KEN FLEMING & THOMAS TACKER,
INTRODUCTION TO AIR TRANSPORT ECONOMICS: FROM THEORY TO APPLICATIONS 12526 (2d ed. 2013). A doubling of passengers reduces fixed cost per passenger by half.
See Jan K. Brueckner & Pablo T. Spiller, Economies of Traffic Density in the
Deregulated Airline Industry, 37 J. L. & ECON. 379 (1994) for an assessment of the
impact of density on airline costs.
41. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 80.
42. See id. at 64, 66.
43. See id. at 88.
44. See id. at 88-89.
45. See id. at 89.
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Despite typically great differences in general population density
between Europe and the U.S., the hub-and-spoke system also
developed in Europe.46 In both the U.S. and Europe, LCCs generally
fly on point-to-point routes between selected cities.47 LCCs typically
employ their own computer booking systems, offer only unassigned
economy class seats, and make ancillary charges for anything beyond
the cost of passage.48 LCCs also realize lower operational costs by
employing only a limited range of aircrafts, which has impeded their
entry into the transatlantic market.
LCC base fares are far lower than those of the firms called
“legacy” carriers in the U.S. and “full service” carriers (FSCs) in
Europe. In fact, one European classification puts firms with fares of
50% of the “full-service” price into the “low-cost” category. Using a
similar scheme, there were ten low-cost carriers based in the EU in
2017 but only five full-service carriers: British Airways, KLM-Air
France, Lufthansa, Finnair, and Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS).
LCC Ryanair grew to overtake Lufthansa in 2016 as the largest carrier
in Europe.49 By 2015 LCCs accounted for 48% of total seat capacity
in the EU while the FSCs offered fewer seats than in 1998.50
In the U.S. there are now only three legacy or full service
carriers: Delta, United, and American.51 And the best known U.S.
LCC, Southwest, has had a larger U.S. passenger volume than any of
the legacy three in some recent years at about 20% (American was
slightly larger than Southwest in 2017) with no other LCC above about
5%.52 Although Southwest is taking on some the of the legacy carriers’
characteristics, such as developing some hubs and a business class, it

46. See, e.g., German Aerospace Center Release 1.01, Analyses of the
European Air Transport Market: Airline Business Models ¶ 3.3 (2008) (Development
at Different Airports – Hub vs. Secondary Airports).
47. See, e.g., Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 27-30.
48. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 95-96.
49. Lufthansa, however, at least temporarily overtook Ryanair in 2017 as
Europe’s largest carrier, after Ryanair was forced to cut thousands of flights because
of pilot rostering problems. Ryanair Loses Europe’s Largest Airline Crown to
Lufthansa, IRISH TIMES (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.irishtimes.com/
business/transport-and-tourism/ryanair-loses-europe-s-largest-airline-crown-tolufthansa-1.3350878 [https://perma.cc/L9UR-DR3C].
50. Commission Communication to the European Parliament, the Council,
the European Economic and Social Committee, and the Committee of Regions on An
Aviation Strategy for Europe, at 16, COM (2015) 598 final (Dec. 7, 2015).
51. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 539-40.
52. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Airline Domestic Market Share July 2017-June
2018, https://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/SC7J-NXS7].
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is still generally classified as an LCC, joined by JetBlue, Allegiant,
and Alaska.53
B. Airline Demand
Airline demand differs from that of most products because of
network effects.54 A large share of the travelling public (mostly
business travelers) will choose one airline over another because of the
frequency of flights, and both business travelers and others travelling
to provincial cities will choose an airline that possesses the ability to
book complex schedules easily.55 This means, ceteris paribus, that
large airlines in terms of both volume on particular routes and the
multiplicity of such routes have a demand advantage.56 And it also
explains the growth of code-sharing or interline ticket booking (a
cooperative practice in which one airline books seats on a second
airline and sells them as its own) early in the deregulation period.57
Without code-sharing, passengers would need to recheck their bags
with a change of carrier.58 But even arm’s length cooperation—like no
cooperation at all—presents the problem of “double marginalization,”
the phenomenon in which the price of each part of the trip is set
without regard for the diminished demand on the other part.59 In such
a circumstance, both parts of the journey are priced excessively for
joint profit maximization, and closer coordination can improve both
seller and buyer welfare.60
The income elasticity of demand for air travel is fairly high.
Estimates have been made by region and length of haul––longer
journeys tend to be more elastic, and for most countries they range
from 1.5-2.0.61 Market-wide price elasticities are quite low: At the
53. See Dipasis Bhadra & Pamela Texter, Airline Networks: An Econometric
Framework to Analyze Domestic U.S. Air Travel, 7 J. TRANSP. & STAT. 87, 89 (2017).
54. See Severin Borenstein, Trends: Pray for JetBlue, MILKEN INST. REV. 5,
7 (2014).
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 76.
58. Without a code-sharing or similar agreement, the two or more airlines
carrying a passenger on separate segments of a trip would be contracting separately
with the passenger for their respective segments. Each carrier, accordingly, would be
responsible only for its own segment.
59. See William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity Grants
to Joint Venture Agreements: Evidence from International Airline Alliances, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 443, 458 (2012).
60. See id.
61. See MARK SMYTH & BRIAN PEARCE, AIR TRAVEL DEMAND: IATA
ECONOMICS BRIEFING NO. 9-10 (2008), https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/
documents/economics/air_travel_demand.pdf [https://perma.cc/9C85-FBWQ].
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national level most estimates are less than one.62 This, of course, still
allows for very high price cross elasticities across carriers on the same
route.63 In addition, there is price discrimination across different
classes of passengers with business passengers paying a much higher
mark-up over the cost of service than others.64 Although only the North
American and European markets have been studied in detail, these
general characteristics seem very likely to apply globally.65
C. From Cost and Demand to Market Conditions
Classic industrial organization analyses stress market structure
and consequent firm conduct to explain overall market performance.66
This paradigm has seen some revision over the decades, particularly
by making structural characteristics endogenous and firm conduct less
predictable,67 yet the categories remain intuitive and analytically
useful.
Structural characteristics include concentration, barriers to entry,
and product differentiation.68 The concern about concentration is
twofold: All else equal, the smaller the number of firms in the market,
the greater their likely recognition of mutual dependence and the less
likely they are to engage in easily matched competitive behavior that
will leave each participant worse off.69 In addition, where increasing
market concentration leads firms to sell substitute products that
previously were competing, those products can be jointly priced
within the firm to maximize profits.70
Following deregulation in the U.S. there was a spate of entry
followed by exits and consolidation.71 After the late eighties, the
national market structure stabilized and aggregate concentration

62. See id. at 25. Both income and price elasticities are calculated by asking
what would happen if price or income changed by one percent over the range in
question, holding all other factors constant.
63. See id. at 10.
64. See Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, supra note 3, at 548-49. Of
course, business travelers are receiving value for their higher fares in the frequencies
of flights and the large networks available to them. See id.
65. See SMYTH & PEARCE, supra note 61, at 10.
66. See DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 244 (4th ed. 2005).
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See STEVEN A. MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE EVOLUTION OF
THE AIRLINE INDUSTRY 9 (1995).
70. See Gillespie & Richard, supra note 59, at 458.
71. See MORRISON & WINSTON, supra note 69, at 8-9.
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varied only slightly72 until the three major mergers of the past few
years (Northwest-Delta, United-Continental and American–US Air).
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)73 of 1,404 for U.S. airlines
measured by passenger miles in 2013 indicates an un-concentrated
market.74 The 2013 EU-wide index was only 524.75 EU-wide
concentration figures over time must be used with care because
complete international freedom within the EU for EU-based carriers
was established only in 1997.76 But the relevant market for
competition policy in the airlines is acknowledged to be the city-pair,
so broader concentration figures have only limited meaning.77
Considering the more relevant route-level concentration, data
have been calculated for the U.S. for both hub and non-hub routes.78
Routes from the twelve major hubs were somewhat less concentrated
than other routes until the mid-eighties, at which point they became
more concentrated by 1989.79 The HHIs of these hubs stood at 4,800,
and the HHIs of non-hubs stood at 4,000.80 This was followed by hub
deconcentration in recent years so that the index for both groups is
now closer to 4,000.81 Even at this lower number, the index remains in
the highly concentrated category.82
One study of the U.S. in 2014 concluded: “[N]early 90 percent
of all passengers traveled on city-pairs with HHIs above 2,500, and
about 40 percent of city pairs have HHIs in excess of 4,000.”83 In
72. See id. at 8.
73. The index is a measure of industry concentration used in the merger
guidelines of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The index
is calculated by squaring the percentage market share of each firm in the industry and
adding them. Id. Therefore, the maximum possible value of a monopoly is 10,000
(1002). See id. Because the HHI is constructed from the squares of market shares, it
yields a higher number as shares are larger on average and also as the shares are more
unequal.
74. See European Airline Consolidation to Enhance Financials? Few Deals
to Be Done, at Least Locally, CAPA (May 15, 2013, 1:52 AM),
https://centreforaviation.com/analysis/reports/european-airline-consolidation-toenhance-financials-few-deals-to-be-done-at-least-locally-109713
[https://perma.cc/WAB4-Q9YR].
75. See id.
76. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 14.
77. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 102.
78. See id. at 91.
79. See id.
80. Id. at 89.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 91.
83. FIONA SCOTT MORTON, ET AL., BENEFITS OF PRESERVING CONSUMERS
ABILITY TO COMPARE AIRLINE FARES 36 (2015), http://3rxg9qea18zhtl6s2u8jammftwpengine.netdna-ssl.com/wp-content/uploads/
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Europe, typical route level concentration is considerably higher: The
average route had an index of 6,897 in 2015.84 This does not
dependably translate into a lower level of competition, however. Most
of the European population lives in regions that are more densely
settled than the U.S. with major airports far closer together—hence
providing some competition with each other––and with a much higher
level of intermodal competition (i.e., trains and busses). Such facts
have entered into the analyses of EU competition authorities at both
the national and EU levels.85
Barriers to entry into the airline industry are considerable but, as
the various waves of entrants in both Europe and America have
demonstrated, they are often surmounted. Economies of scale, as
distinct from economies of density, are not estimated to be large, and
small-scale entry, sometimes with leased aircrafts, has been frequently
observed.86 Entry conditions under public control such as gates and
slots (a slot is the right of an airline to use airspace and ground
facilities at a particular time) have varied over time and present
considerable difficulty in some U.S. and many more EU markets, but
workarounds through the use of secondary airports have often been
successful.87 “Brand” preference unalloyed by tangible attraction, such
as better airport facilities and especially loyalty discounts such as
frequent flyer programs, seem quite modest.88 In fact, in the early years
of U.S. deregulation, many economists tended to view competition in
the airline industry through the lens of William Baumol’s theory of
contestable markets.89 Under this theory, an industry behaves
competitively if entry and exit into the market are costless.90 Aircrafts
2015/05/CRA.TravelTech.Study_.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BG5W-QSPW].
For
example, an HHI of 2500 in a city-pair market could mean that it is being served by
four equal-sized airlines, and a market with an HHI of above 4000 could mean that it
is being served by three airlines of somewhat unequal size.
84. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 30.
85. See id.
86. See Elizabeth E. Bailey & William J. Baumol, Deregulation and the
Theory of Contestable Markets, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 111, 111, 128 (1984).
87. Ryanair, Europe’s largest carrier and an LCC has used mostly secondary
airports. See, e.g., TOPICAL REPORT: ANALYSES OF EUROPEAN TRANSPORT MARKET:
AIRLINE BUSINESS MODELS 22 (2008) (describing use of secondary airports by
Ryanair).
88. See Michael E. Levine, Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets:
Theory, Firm Strategy, and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 393, 426-28 (1987).
89. See id. at 403-04 (discussing role of contestable market theory during
airline deregulation and recognizing theorists who applied contestability to the airline
industry in the early 1980s); see generally William J. Baumol, Contestable Markets:
An Uprising in the Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (1982).
90. See, e.g., Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The Contestability of
Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 125,
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could be moved from one location to another at low cost;91 therefore,
so the story went, when any airline was able to raise its profits beyond
a competitive return, those profits would attract entry that would
compete them away. Thus, market power and sustained,
supracompetitive returns were impossible in the airline industry.92
This interpretation of the industry has not prospered, despite the
(until recently) accurate prediction that incumbent firms would not
realize sustained profitability.93 The theory’s assumptions were faulty
and so were some of its main predictions. New airline entrants must
incur a set of pre-operating and “ramp-up” costs that are “sunk” (that
is, nonrecoverable) in the event that the entrant leaves the market.94
Moreover, econometric studies have shown that prices are typically
somewhat higher when the number of competitors is lower, and that
the impact of potential competition from legacy carriers alone is
modest.95 On the other hand, one insight from the approach remains
important: The price-cost margins typically associated with very high
concentration can be disciplined by the threat or actual entry by an
aggressive competitor, such as an LCC.96 This was implicit in the
earliest industrial organization literature but was not stressed.97
In both the U.S. and Europe, low-cost carriers have provided by
far the most effective competitive force in the industry.98 The
“Southwest Effect” notes that this firm, which began operating from
Dallas in 1971 as an intrastate airline that soon moved into adjoining
states but did not operate with hubs, has exerted a sharp downward
influence on fares in a market simply by announcing its impending
125 (1981) (applying contestable market theory to city-pair airline markets); see also
Levine, supra note 88, at 403 (recognizing theorists who applied contestability to the
airline industry in the early 1980s).
91. See Bailey & Baumol, supra note 86, at 128.
92. See Bailey & Panzar, supra note 90, at 125, 129 (noting airline prices
were regulated by the possibility of competitors entering the market in 1979–1980
because the market was “nearly perfectly contestable” and discussing how easy entry
and exit into markets by new entities keep pricing competitive).
93. See the discussion in Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 550-51. For a
discussion of the financial history of the airline industry, see id., at 543.
94. See Levine, supra note 88, at 400.
95. See Borenstein & Rose, supra note 34, at 121.
96. See id.
97. See JOE S. BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 299-300 (1959).
98. They have played an even larger role in some low-income countries.
Note, for example, that both prior to the three recent mergers (Delta/Northwest,
United/Continental, American/US Air) and after, the largest carrier in the U.S. was
Southwest, an LCC widely known for its low fares. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note
3, at 551, 578. The same is true for Europe where the largest carrier is Ryanair, an
LCC also widely known for its low fares. See discussion supra, text accompanying
note 50.
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entry.99 In recent years, Southwest’s costs and its prices appear to have
risen relative to the legacy carriers.100 But JetBlue, another of the
LCCs, has grown to be the fifth largest U.S. domestic carrier,101 and,
along with Spirit Airlines, produces strong downward pricing pressure
on the legacy carriers that compete with them.102
In sharp contrast to the impact of impending or actual entry by
LCCs, U.S. data suggest that the competitive impact of legacy carriers
with each other has declined over time.103 One study found that a
change from three to two carriers on a route in 2000 increased prices
by 4%, but a similar change produced negligible price increase by
2008.104 Similarly, a shift from two to one raised prices by 12% in 2000
but only by 3.9% in 2010.105 Severin Borenstein has interpreted such
evidence as suggesting that markets with two or even three firms are
already engaging in full monoploid pricing.106 This is consistent with
a decline in experimentation with alternative business models and the
acceptance of mutual forbearance with price leadership, a standard
outcome in many oligopoly markets dealing in similar products.107 But
this still leaves each airline with some price discrimination latitude
among its own offerings based on estimated demand elasticities across
99. See Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, How Do Incumbents Respond to
the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines 2 (NBER, Working Paper No.
11072, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11072 [https://perma.cc/9FFT-QKJS].
100. See Vinay Bhaskara, Has “The Spirit Effect” Replaced “The Southwest
Effect?”, AIRWAYS (July 20, 2013, 9:07 AM), https://airwaysmag.com/industry/hasthe-spirit-effect-replaced-the-southwest-effect/ [https://perma.cc/NSW4-MALZ].
101. Jetblue is the fifth largest U.S. carrier, behind Southwest, American,
United, and Delta. See On-Flight Market Passengers Enplaned by Unique Carrier for
2015, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://www.transtats.bts.gov/ [https://perma.cc/E4RV7V83].
102. See Bhaskara, supra note 100.
103. See JAN K. BRUECKNER, DARIN LEE, & ETHAN SINGER, NETWORK VS.
LCC COMPETITION AND AIRFARES: NEW EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM THE US 4 (2010),
https://www.iata.org/whatwedo/Documents/economics/Brueckner_
Competition_Fares.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9BW-68RH].
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See Borenstein, supra note 54, at 10.
107. U.S. carriers were enjoined from a particular mechanism of price
coordination based on announcement of intended price change by a settlement with
DOJ in 1994. See generally Press Release, U.S Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department
Settles Airlines Price Fixing Suit, May Save Consumers Hundreds of Millions of
Dollars (Mar. 17, 1994). This still left ample opportunity for price changes to be
offered and rescinded quickly if they went unmatched. See generally ORG. ECON.
COOP. & DEV., SUMMARY RECORD OF DISCUSSION, ANNEX TO THE SUMMARY RECORD
OF THE 121ST MEETING OF THE COMPETITION COMMITTEE HELD ON JUNE 18-19 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=
DAF/COMP/M(2014)2/ANN5/FINAL&doclanguage=en [https://perma.cc/XR4CJT57].
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passengers.108 And competition takes place in non-price dimensions
such as gate facilities, clubs, and frequent flier programs.
Many elements of the European market closely resemble those
in the U.S.109 This is almost definitionally true with broad cost and
demand issues, but the competitive behavior pattern is also very
similar, as the following section confirms. There is little evidence of
aggressive pricing by FSCs and copious evidence of downward price
pressure by LCCs.110
D. Loyalty Programs
Any attempt to understand the role of loyalty programs in the
marketing of air travel necessarily raises two important analytical
points. First, price premia at hub airports reflect the advantages of
flying from a hub, which are the convenience of a direct flight and the
direct network access that a hub provides.111 Lederman, however, has
estimated that at least a quarter of the hub premium represents the
value of the incumbent airlines’ frequent flyer programs (although
overall hub premia have declined over time).112 Second, the attraction
of loyalty discounting cannot be distinguished from other increases in
travelers’ perceived value of larger networks in the econometric
studies that the Department of Justice (DOJ) found persuasive in
approving recent U.S. mergers.113
There has been much written over the years about the role of
loyalty programs in discouraging competition in both Europe and
America.114 Yet Southwest is now the largest domestic U.S. carrier,
and Ryanair is the largest carrier in the EU.115 Therefore, experience
108. See ORG. ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 107, at 4.
109. This is widely recognized. See, e.g., Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at
5-6 (discussing U.S. deregulation and EU liberalization).
110. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 24.
111. See Mara Lederman, Are Frequent-Flyer Programs a Cause of the ‘Hub
Premium?’, 17 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 35, 36 (2008).
112. See id.; see generally Mara Lederman, Do Enhancements to Loyalty
Programs Affect Demand? The Impact of International Frequent Flyer Partnerships
on Domestic Airline Demand, 38 RAND J. ECON 1134 (2007).
113. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 566-69.
114. See, e.g., Ramon Caminal & Adina Claici, Are Loyalty-Rewarding
Pricing Schemes Anti-Competitive? 25 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 657 (2007).
115. See European Commission, ANNUAL ANALYSES OF THE EU AIR
TRANSPORT MARKET 2016, 12 (2017) (table top 1.0 airlines by passengers). Southwest
has long had its own loyalty program, but it attained substantial market penetration
without it, and Ryanair began its program only in 2017. Southwest began its first
loyalty program, called The Company Club, in 1987. See Southwest Airlines Media,
1984-1989, https://www.swamedia.com/pages/1984-to-1989 [https://perma.cc/
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on both sides of the Atlantic suggests that a traveler loyalty program
is neither necessary nor sufficient for competitive success. Moreover,
such programs are employed by scores of airlines around the world.116
Our view is that a direct attack on loyalty programs by public policy
would be a kind of “nuclear option” that should be considered only if
they can be shown to protect chronic excess profitability, which is very
far from the record so far.
E. Two Sets of Players
A major difference between the U.S. and the EU lies in the
parallel development of the European airline industry and the EU
itself.117 More than a dozen substantial private U.S. carriers
participated in the market when American liberalization began.118 In
Europe at that time most major states had their own national carrier,
usually owned by the government.119 The European story is necessarily
one of discrete national markets dissolving and with them some of the
national prerogatives agreed upon at the Chicago Convention of
1944.120
In July 1992, the European Council adopted Regulation
2408/92,121 thereby complying with its obligations under previous
Council Regulation 2343/90 to establish an air transport policy
abolishing capacity restrictions between Member States by the year’s
end.122 Regulation 2408/92 effectively postponed the adoption of the
new policy until April 1, 1997, at which time so-called “cabotage”
among European airlines was to be implemented, permitting any
airline registered in a member state of the European Union to offer air
service in any member state.123 Prior to April 1997, most European
national airlines operated from one central airport and dealt with intraEU traffic on the basis of bilateral agreements aimed at something like
N3EV-H4T8]. Ryanair’s loyalty program began in 2017. See Rachel Gee, Ryanair
Looks to Grow Loyalty Scheme by Making Membership Automatic, MARKETINGWEEK
(Nov. 7, 2016, 3:18 PM),
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/11/07/ryanair-looks-to-grow-loyaltyscheme-by-making-membership-automatic/ [https://perma.cc/7GPY-5QSE].
116. See ORG. ECON. COOP. & DEV., supra note 107, at 8, 13, 15-16 (describing
frequent flyer programs in Peru, Canada, Turkey, Europe, and elsewhere).
117. See id. at 3.
118. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 541.
119. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 5.
120. See id. at 7.
121. See Council Regulation 2408/92 of 23 July 1992, On Access for
Community Air Carriers to Intracommunity Air Routes, 1992 O.J. (L 240) 8.
122. See id.
123. See id. art 3.
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balanced trade.124 Bilateral agreements restricting the number of
flights and airports were often struck and subsequently adjusted to
protect the welfare of the dominant flag carrier.125 At least by 1990,126
however, the European Council had embarked on a transitional policy
that would take it to the full cabotage policy of 1997.127 The 1997
liberalization was thoroughgoing: National firms from any member
state could operate anywhere in the EU without restriction.128 But
movement by the flag carriers to seize the new opportunities was
sluggish. In sharp contrast, entry by low-cost carriers was dramatic
and extensive; the LCC share beyond their country of base registration
grew to become approximately half of all their operations as their total
EU market share expanded from 3% in 2001 to 27% in 2013.129 The
FSCs, like their U.S. legacy counterparts, developed more complex
hub-and-spoke operations both before and after intra-EU
liberalization; the LCCs, again like their transatlantic counterparts, did
not.130
The share of low-cost carriers in both the U.S. and EU continues
to grow, but the FSC airlines offer features typically not found with
LCCs,131 which are valued by many passengers; whether these features
can sustain their current price premia cannot be confidently forecast.
Most EU FSCs have either expired or merged, but, like their U.S.
cousins, the survivors have been experiencing rising profits in the very
recent past with global economic expansion.132 As this Article will
argue later, there is little reason for confidence that this can be
sustained.
F. Merger Policy
There are two rationales for mergers, and by extension, for
alliances short of complete merger: (1) the creation of market power,
or (2) the generation of efficiencies. Typically, both of these rationales
124. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 7.
125. See id.
126. See Council Regulation 2343/90 on Access for Air Carriers to Scheduled
Intra-Community Air Service Routes and on the Sharing of Passenger Capacity
Between Air Carriers on Scheduled Air Services Between Member States; IntraCommunity Air Routes, 1990 O.J. (L 217) 5; see also Council Decision of 14 Dec.
1987, 1987 O.J. (L 371) 76.
127. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 13.
128. See id. at 14.
129. Id. at 20.
130. See id. at 14.
131. See id.
132. See Press Release, IATA, Strong Airline Profitability Continues in 2018
(Dec. 5, 2017).
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are present.133 Democratic governments are generally understood to
carry the responsibility for fostering social welfare or at least
consumer welfare.134 Governments should (and usually do) oppose
mergers and alliances that create market power without compensating
economic improvements. When a merger or alliance generates both
market power and efficiencies, governments should block those
mergers and alliances in which the sum of these effects reduces
welfare, and they should allow those mergers and alliances where a
positive consumer welfare effect predominates.135
As noted, recent scholarship has revealed that the price effects
resulting from reductions in the number of competitors in city-pair
markets within the U.S. have been diminishing.136 The causes of these
effects are unclear. The diminished effects may be the result of the
airlines’ having already exploited most of their market power, and so
the merger creates little additional power to exploit; LCC competition
provides another, complementary, explanation.137 In a recent article,
Brueckner, Lee, and Singer report that:
[T]he period between 2000 and 2008 represented a period of tremendous
growth for LCCs with their collective share of domestic . . . passengers
increasing by more than half, from 22% to 36% . . . . LCC competition,
whether it is in-market, adjacent or potential, exerts a dramatic negative
effect on fares in airline markets.138

As we have argued elsewhere, a straightforward rationale can be
offered for why the DOJ approved the three recent mergers: The
legacy carriers were unlikely either to compete vigorously on routes
that they share or to enter as contestants beyond their long-established
basic networks.139 On the other hand, various studies have
demonstrated both theoretically and empirically that the creation of
denser route networks can raise welfare.140 By raising the value of a
typical itinerary to a typical customer, some price rises are consistent
with overall purchaser welfare gains. In fact, a recent study by Carlton
133. See Robert Bork’s opinion in Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van
Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 220-21 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
134. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 25-28. The appropriate standard
for this determination in the U.S. is unsettled, but enforcers typically use the consumer
standard. See id. In the EU, the consumer standard is settled law. See id.
135. See id. at 27.
136. See BRUECKNER, LEE & SINGER, supra note 103, at 4.
137. See Jan K. Brueckner, Darin Lee & Ethan S. Singer, Airline Competition
and Domestic US Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2 ECON. TRANSP. 1, 7, 11
(2013).
138. Id. at 11.
139. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 49.
140. See Kai Hüschelrath & Kathrin Müller, Airline Networks, Mergers, and
Consumer Welfare, 48 J. TRANSP. ECON. & POL’Y 385, 385 (2014).
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et al. shows both an increase in demand and lower prices on routes
that had already been served by the merging airlines.141 Such mergers,
which greatly increase concentration beyond what the merger
guidelines would ordinarily regard as acceptable, could be justified by
the guidelines’ recognition of product quality improvements
anticipated from the merger.142
In the merger of Delta and Northwest in 2002, the airlines,
although competitors, each contributed an extensive, non-overlapping
network to the merged company and thus added significant value that
would accrue to consumers.143 This increased consumer benefit plus
the production efficiencies generated by the merger probably more
than offset the merger’s price effects, which, as noted, were likely to
be modest.144 The merger of United and Continental in 2010 similarly
produced significant consumer benefit from network effects and
efficiencies that in combination offset all or much of the merger’s
price effects.145 The DOJ, however, additionally required a significant
freeing up of slots (and three gates) for the benefit of LCCs as a step
toward increasing competition.146 The merger of American and US Air
was approved by the DOJ under similar techniques, including the
mandatory release of slots.147 In these three merger cases, the DOJ’s
approval appears to have been grounded on the diminishing price
effects;148 the consumer benefit expected from the network effects and
merger-generated efficiencies;149 plus, in the last two cases, the
anticipated competitive effects produced by the slot releases.150
Consistent with the importance attributed to slot releases by the DOJ
in its evaluation of domestic mergers, we will see that slot releases
also play a critical role in the Department of Transportation’s (DOT’s)
review of international airline alliances.
141. See Dennis Carlton, et al., Are Legacy Airline Mergers Pro- or AntiCompetitive? Evidence from Recent U.S. Airline Mergers, INT’L J. INDUS. ORG.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 3).
142. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 3, at 29.
The merger guidelines recognize the theoretical relevance of the non-price effects of
mergers. See id. at 10 (stating the enforcement agencies methodology is concentrated
on price effects because those effects are quantifiable “not because price effects are
more important than non-price effects”).
143. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 566-69 (discussing the
contribution of network effects to the consumer benefit generated by recent domestic
mergers).
144. See id. at 568.
145. See id. at 570-72.
146. See id. at 572.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 571.
149. See id. at 572
150. See id. at 572-73.
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The old national barriers to mergers within the EU involving
airlines from different EU member states no longer apply. In the socalled “open skies” cases, the Court of Justice ruled on the lawfulness
of treaties between the U.S. and certain member states of the EU.151
The problem arose because those member states that had entered into
a treaty had acquired rights for their national airlines that were not
available to airlines from other member states.152 The Court saw this
as discrimination against the member states that had not entered into
such a treaty and their airlines.153 In effect the ruling meant that, for
purposes of airline regulation, the EU as a whole would be treated as
a single state.154 This development thus changed the rules for mergers
and potential mergers within the EU, but mergers between an EUbased airline and an airline from a non-EU country (such as the U.S.,
for example) remained subject to the old rules and remained
prohibited.155 The Commission, under these new rules, approved the
merger of British Airways and Iberia in 2010156 and Aer Lingus’s
takeover by IAG in 2015.157 While intra-EU political boundaries no
longer constrain mergers between EU airlines, competition rules
continue to apply.158 It was on these grounds that the Commission
blocked Ryanair’s attempted takeover of Air Lingus three times.159
G. Anti-Competitive Conduct
Following the 1991 Cooperation Agreement and the 1998
Positive Comity Agreement, transatlantic cooperation is apparently
very close on price-fixing investigations. Several major airlines were
involved in price-fixing schemes on air freight a decade ago, and
151. See generally Case C-467/98, Comm’n v. Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-9528;
Case C-466/98, Comm’n v. United Kingdom, 2002 E.C.R. I-9496.
152. See European Commission Press Release IP/02/1609, Open Sky
Agreements: Commission Welcomes European Court of Justice Ruling (Nov. 5,
2002) (describing the background leading up to the “open skies” cases and the Court’s
ruling).
153. See generally Denmark, 2002 E.C.R. I-9528.
154. See Air Transport Agreement, 2007 O.J. (L 134) 4 (resolving the problem
raised by separate airline agreements between the U.S. and particular member states
of the EU).
155. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
156. See European Commission Press Release IP/10/938, Mergers:
Commission Approves Merger Between British Airways and Iberia (July 14, 2010).
157. See European Commission Press Release IP/15/5371, Mergers:
Commission Approves Acquisition of Aer Lingus by IAG, Subject to Conditions (July
14, 2015).
158. See Council Regulation 139/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 24), 1.
159. See European Commission Press Release IP/13/167, Mergers:
Commission Prohibits Ryanair’s Proposed Takeover of Aer Lingus (Feb. 27, 2013).
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settlements were reached.160 The DOJ conducted an investigation of
possible collusion on capacity restraint by the major U.S. carriers in
2015 and 2016, but that investigation was ultimately dropped for lack
of evidence.161
Both the U.S. and the EU pursue cartel cases by extending
leniency to the first cooperator.162 The EU also offers reduced penalties
for subsequent cooperation, and the U.S. offers plea bargaining.163 The
only major differences on airline cartel behavior across the Atlantic
have nothing to do with this specific industry but inhere in basic legal
differences between the two legal systems that impede cooperation
and cannot be easily circumvented: In the U.S., antitrust violations can
result in criminal sanctions being imposed upon individuals under the
Sherman Act, and treble damages can be levied in private actions.164
Neither result is possible in the EU.165 The availability of treble
damages largely explains why three-quarters of U.S. antitrust cases
arise in private litigation.166 In EU proceedings, penalties still involve
only fines levied against firms following a finding of illegality by the
Commission.167 Compensation for injury caused by an antitrust
violation is a right recognized by EU institutions, “but its exercise is
governed by national rules.”168 As a result, according to the
Commission, “most victims, particularly SMEs [small and medium
size enterprises] and consumers, rarely obtain compensation.”169 On
the Commission’s recommendation, however, the European
Parliament and Council have adopted a directive that attempts to
reduce the impediments to recovery of damages for injuries caused by
160. See Vanessa Page, Justice Department Said to be Dropping Airline
Collusion Case (DAL, AAL), INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 13, 2017, 1:55 PM)
https://www.investopedia.com/news/justice-department-said-be-dropping-airlinecollusion-case-dal-aal/#ixzz508W8AcEJ [https://perma.cc/2S4H-UD9A].
161. See id. Agreements among airlines limiting capacity growth would be
problematic. Unless precisely drafted, they would present almost insuperable
interpretive issues, and it is doubtful that any such agreement could escape detection
by airline legal counsel.
162. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 213.
163. See id. at 20, 22, 213; see also Robert E. Bloch, Jens Peter Schmidt, Gary
A. Winters & Jennifer Driscoll, Plea Bargaining and Settlement Procedures in the
United States and Europe, in LENIENCY IN CARTEL INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE (2007).
164. See id. at 17-18.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 18.
167. See Antitrust Actions for Damages Overview, EUR. COMMISSION
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S3LH-K8NM] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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antitrust violations.170 The damages issue was brought to a head in the
air-freight proceedings, which began in 2006, resulting in the
European Commission’s imposition of substantial fines on a number
of carriers for concerted price fixing.171 Follow-up actions on behalf of
the conspiracy’s victims were instituted in several national courts.172
When the General Court reversed the Commission’s decision for
internal inconsistencies,173 the damages actions were thrown into
disarray because the national courts are required to follow the lead of
the Commission when they consider damages.174
The EU proceedings highlight differences in the effectiveness of
European and American antitrust laws to compensate those injured by
antitrust violations. While the European air cargo litigation was mired
in unresolved procedural issues, an antitrust class action against the
air cargo conspirators in the U.S. produced a series of settlements
totaling $1.2 billion. The EU ultimately also fined the participating
firms €776 million in 2017, but injury (damage recovery) claims
remained to be litigated.175
H. Predatory Behavior
Several cases in the U.S. have focused on the role of predatory
pricing as a key element in exclusion, but the usual average variable
cost standard for incumbents has not prevented effective predation. In
the EU, where the legal standards governing predatory pricing are
broad enough to allow greater challenge to questionable pricing
practices, no predatory pricing cases have been brought by the EU
Commission against any airline company.
170. See generally Directive 2014/104 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 26 November 2014 on Certain Rules Governing Actions for Damages
Under National Law for Infringements of the Competition Law Provisions of the
Member States and of the European Union, 2014 O.J. (L 349).
171. See General Court of the European Union Press Release No. 147/15, The
General Court Annuls the Decision by Which the Commission Imposed Fines
Amounting to Approximately €790 Million on Several Airlines for Their Participation
in a Cartel on the Airfreight Market (Dec. 16, 2015).
172. See, e.g., Geert Goeteyn, Susanna Charlwood & Agostino Bignardi,
Temporal Scope of Follow-On Claims in the Air-Transport Sector: The English High
Court Rules in Favour of Air Cargo Defendants, Subject to Pending Appeal (Sept. 4,
2018),
http://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/27/article/29275/private-antitrustlitigation-temporal-scope-follow-o-claimants-air-transport-sector-english-high-court
[https://perma.cc/2LX9-397C].
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See European Commission Press Release IP/17/661, Antitrust:
Commission Re-adopts Decision and Fines Air Cargo Carriers €776 Million for Pricefixing Cartel (Mar. 17, 2017).
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In the U.S., the Supreme Court adopted the Brooke Group
predation standard in 1993,176 although the basic components of that
standard were known earlier and were imbedded in the Court’s case
law.177 The Brooke Group standard requires two criteria to be met
beyond the possession of market power (which would typically be
indicated by market share): sales below an appropriate measure of cost
and a likelihood of recoupment.178 The appropriate cost standard was
undefined in Brooke Group although the Court had earlier suggested
some version of incremental cost would be satisfactory.179 The lower
courts generally use average variable cost as the effective boundary
between predatory and non-predatory pricing.180
The Brooke Group format was severely tested in the American
Airlines case.181 The DOJ filed suit against American Airlines in 1999
for predatory behavior towards several LCCs: Vanguard, Western
Pacific, and Sunjet, on three routes connecting Dallas-Fort Worth with
Wichita, Colorado Springs, and Long Beach.182 The district and circuit
courts attempted as far as possible to follow the scheme established in
Brooke Group of determining (1) that the incumbent would have
market power without the additional competition provided by the
LCCs, (2) that American engaged in pricing below some appropriate
measure of its costs, and (3) that there was a “dangerous probability”
of subsequent recoupment of losses incurred during the predatory
176. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222-24 (1993).
177. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986)
(defining predatory pricing as “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost”);
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)
(emphasizing the relevance of recoupment).
178. See Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222-24 (explaining the two criteria for
predatory pricing).
179. See, e.g., Cargill, 479 U.S. at 117-18 n.12 (declining to consider recovery
when pricing is above incremental cost); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 585 n.9 (stating that
the Court will not consider recovery when pricing is above incremental cost); see also
Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 223 (noting earlier opinions in which the Court has declined
to consider recovery based on pricing above incremental cost). Incremental cost has
been interpreted as some measure of avoidable cost. See Competition and Monopoly:
Single Firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: Chapter 4, U.S. DEP’T
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firmconduct-under-section-2-sherman-act-chapter-4 [https://perma.cc/876F-XJA8] (last
visited Oct. 22, 2018) (stating that incremental cost is another name for avoidable
cost).
180. See Phillip E. Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related
Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700 (1975)
(explaining the relationship between average variable cost and marginal cost).
Average variable cost is a short-cut approximation of marginal cost. See id.
181. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1120 (10th Cir. 2003).
182. See id. at 1112-13.
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period.183 (The recoupment issue was cast in “dangerous probability”
language because the plaintiffs charged American with attempted
monopolization.)184 American Airlines claimed that it was simply
meeting competition by matching the lower prices of the LCCs.185
Both sides attempted to establish whether American actually did price
below the usually accepted average variable cost standard.186 Although
the district and circuit courts left the appropriate standard unresolved
because the DOJ’s cost estimates were rejected,187 the circuit court did
affirm that the appropriate cost was only additional capacity and not
opportunity cost.188
The DOJ argued that American’s increased capacity on the
contested routes greatly diluted demand for the newcomers’ similarly
priced product––and therefore constituted a violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act independent of predatory pricing––but the courts did not
accept the argument.189 Significantly, however, the circuit court did not
reject DOJ’s contention that predatory pricing in one venue need not
result in recoupment there alone but instead could plausibly have
broader profitability impact by signaling the fate of entrants in other
markets.190
In 2000, Spirit Airlines sued Northwest Airlines for violating § 2
of the Sherman Act.191 The pattern again involved lowering prices
toward that of the entrant while greatly increasing capacity with the
effect of reducing demand for the entrant’s offering.192 This was

183. See generally id.
184. See id. at 1111.
185. See id. at 1120 n.15.
186. See id. at 1113.
187. See id. at 1120-21.
188. See id. at 1119.
189. See id. at 1113.
190. Gregory J. Werden, The American Airlines Decision: Not with a Bang
but a Whimper, 18 ANTITRUST 32, 35 (2003) (“[O]ne might infer that the court
implicitly accepted the Department’s recoupment theory.”); see also AMR Corp., 335
F.3d at 1115.
191. See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917, 921
(6th Cir. 2004); see also Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., No. 0071535, 2003 WL 24197742, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 31, 2003) (indicating the date of
the commencement of Spirit’s lawsuit against Northwest). For a discussion of the
case, see generally James L. Robenalt, Note, Predatory Pricing in the Low-Fare
Airline Market: Targeted, Discriminatory, and Achieved with Impunity, 68 OHIO ST.
L.J. 641 (2007); see also generally Thomas Gorin & Peter Belobaba, Assessing
Predation in Airline Markets with Low-Fare Competition (Indus. Studies Ass’n
Working Paper Series, Paper No. WP-2005-07, 2005), http://isapapers.pitt.edu/63/
[https://perma.cc/5YGF-HU4P].
192. See Spirit Airlines, 431 F.3d at 923-24.
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followed by a sharp increase in price after the LCC’s withdrawal.193
Spirit constructed a case that did not involve recoupment beyond the
Detroit airport.194 Instead, it argued that delays in new entry alone
would have made Northwest’s price and capacity changes
profitable.195 Although Spirit’s case was rejected by the district court’s
summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case for a full trial in 2005.196 Spirit then dropped the case after
Northwest filed for bankruptcy.197 We are left with no resolution of the
usefulness of the predatory-pricing doctrine in the airline industry.
The DOT received many airline predation complaints by the late
nineties.198 In response, the DOT issued a proposed approach to
predation in 1999 tailored especially to the airline industry and based
upon a legal framework different from the one developed by the
courts.199 The DOT proposal bypassed the prevailing precedent (most
notably Brooke Group) by not employing price and cost relations at
all.200 Instead the test would simply be whether or not a capacity
expansion by a dominant firm costs that firm more revenue than the
entrant would have diverted from it or costs more than the result of
either matching the entrant’s fares or establishing the same relative
fares as with better established entrants elsewhere.201
Although the DOT’s proposal was based on its legal authority to
prevent unfair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of
competition,202 it did not fare well. Congress responded to the
Department’s proposal by mandating a study by the National
Academies’ Transportation Research Board (TRB), which failed to
endorse the DOT’s policy.203 A Government Accountability Office
report of 1999 noted that several airlines had criticized the DOT
proposal’s language as vague, and that the DOT was planning on
193. See id. at 924.
194. See id. at 930.
195. See id. at 951.
196. See id. at 921.
197. See Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing in the
Airline Industry: Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines, in 6 THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 307, 333 (John E. Kwoka, Jr.
& Lawrence J. White eds., 2014).
198. See, e.g., Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Exclusionary Conduct in
the Air Transportation Industry, 63 Fed. Reg. 17,919, 17,919 (Apr. 10, 1998).
199. See generally id.
200. See id. at 17,920; see also generally Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
201. See id.
202. See 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2012).
203. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OST-98-3713, ENFORCEMENT POLICY
REGARDING UNFAIR EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT IN THE AIR TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
(2001).
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refining its terminology.204 Finally, in January 2001, the DOT decided
to deal with predatory behavior in fact-specific adjudications under §
41712.205
In the EU, prices below average avoidable cost206 are viewed as
predatory, costs between average avoidable costs and long run
incremental costs as subject to question, and prices above that level as
a safe harbor.207 The enforcing agency for the EU, the European
Commission, aims to discover a predatory strategy and regards only
pricing below long-run incremental costs as usually capable of
foreclosing an equally efficient competitor.208 Although it has
elsewhere recognized the usefulness of a recoupment test for
evaluating predatory pricing, the Commission, in its current guidance,
uses a test of whether a dominant firm has been able to strengthen its
market power.209
The major airline predatory pricing case in the EU, Lufthansa v.
Germania, was handled by the German Bundeskartellamt210 rather
than DG Comp211 and reveals a very different approach from that of
the U.S. authorities.212 A small German start-up, Germania, began
offering a Frankfurt-Berlin one-way ticket in late 2001 at €99 when
Lufthansa was charging more than four times that amount for a roundtrip flight.213 Lufthansa immediately introduced a €100 one-way
ticket.214 The German authority attacked the response on three
grounds. First, the higher quality of the Lufthansa product meant that
the quality-corrected price was actually lower than Germania’s.
Second, the introduction of the low price on only one route suggested
204. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-99-225, AVIATION
COMPETITION: INFORMATION ON THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION’S PROPOSED
POLICY 15 (1999).
205. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 203.
206. See Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings, 2009 O.J. (C 45) 7, 11 n.2 [hereinafter Guidance]. For a discussion of
how the average avoidable cost differs from more familiar cost measures, see
generally William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost
Test, 39 J.L. & ECON. 49 (1996).
207. See Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie BV v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439,
3455.
208. See Guidance, supra note 206, at 17.
209. See id.
210. Germany’s Federal Cartel Office.
211. The Directorate-General for Competition of the European Commission.
212. See BKartA 2002, B 9-144/01, https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/
SharedDocs/Entscheidung/DE/Entscheidungen/Missbrauchsaufsicht/2002/B9-14401.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=4 [https://perma.cc/J57M-UJ2X].
213. Id.
214. Id.
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a possibly predatory strategy. Third, it was argued that the price
charged by Lufthansa did not cover durchschnittlichen Gesamtkosten
(average total cost),215 a criterion that seems stricter than that typically
used in the EU, as noted in the previous discussion, and much higher
than employed in the U.S. The Bundeskartellamt insisted that the
Lufthansa price be at least €35 higher than Germania.216 This was
based on a calculation of an imputed price for the ticket alone,
subtracting from the total price paid the following amounts for “free”
customer benefits: €1 for a newspaper, €2 for a soft drink, €12 for
frequent flier miles, and €25 for higher frequency of flights.217 This
was followed by a downward adjustment to €35.218 The determination
of the final (and largest) factor seems particularly problematic.
Overall, the apparent objective of the remedy was to bar Lufthansa
from pricing below the quality-adjusted price of the entrant.
The quality-corrected price seems conceptually confused. The
issue that the Bundeskartellamt dealt with was whether the Lufthansa
customer received more for his money than the Germania customer.
A straightforward resolution of the predatory issue would compare
prices and costs. There was no dispute about the price of the Lufthansa
ticket. Therefore, the proper issue is whether Lufthansa sold the ticket
below its cost. There is no need to adjust price for quality. The
approach of the Bundeskartellamt appears to be an attempt to follow
the approach of the Court of Justice, which has ruled that, where
predatory strategy is shown, it is appropriate to use an average total
cost standard.219
There have been many suggested remedies for predatory
behavior toward entrants that completely ignore price-cost analysis,
and several have aimed specifically at the airline industry. One of the
continuing difficulties in this area is a lack of definitional consensus
on predation. The U.S. Supreme Court defined predation in Brooke
Group,220 the DOJ tried out a broader definition in the American
Airlines case,221 the European authorities have formulated definitions
that downplay recoupment and tend to heighten the importance of
215. See id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Case C-62/86, Akzo Chemie BV v. Comm’n, 1991 E.C.R. I-3439,
3455-56. Pricing below average total cost but above average variable cost is predatory
only if the seller is shown to be following a strategy to eliminate competitors.
220. See Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S.
209, 222-24 (1993).
221. See generally United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir.
2003).
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intent, and the DOT developed its approach, discussed above.222 In
addition, Oliver Williamson proposed in 1977 that incumbents not be
allowed to expand their output for twelve to eighteen months
following entry,223 while William Baumol suggested two years later
that incumbents could reduce prices in response to entry but that they
must then maintain those lower prices for a period following the
departure of the entrant.224 More recently, Aaron Edlin proposed that
dominant incumbents be barred from price cuts, capacity expansion,
or other product improvement until the entrant had succeeded in
penetrating the market.225 Einer Elhauge subsequently pointed out the
perverse incentives that could result from Edlin’s rule because the
incumbent might respond by raising prices to reduce market share to
a sufficient extent that the constraint was removed.226
But how serious is the problem in this industry? In an important
study, Bamberger and Carlton examined data on entry, exit, and prices
in U.S. city-pair markets from 1991 through 2003.227 While conceding
that “our analysis cannot rule out isolated instances of predatory
conduct,” aggregate data suggest most new entrants were successful
during the major period of DOT concern, 1995–1999, by the criterion
of service to a city for a least a year following the establishment of at
least 1% market share.228 In addition, entry was not followed by
substantial fall in established carriers’ average fares,229 nor did those
fares rise after low-fare carrier’s exit. Finally, the growth of LCC
market penetration from 1999–2003 does not seem to have been the
result of less aggressive competition by the established carriers.230
Our view is that the current situation does not demand a clear
new policy on predatory pricing for airlines and that the current
222. See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 203.
223. See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare
Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 295-96, 333-36 (1977).
224. See William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A
Policy for Prevention of Predatory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1, 3 n.8 (1979).
225. See Aaron Edlin, Stopping Above-Cost Predatory Pricing, 111 YALE L.J.
941, 946 (2002).
226. See Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants
Are Not Predatory—and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112
YALE L.J. 681, 687-88 (2003).
227. See generally Gustavo E. Bamberger & Dennis W. Carlton, Predation
and the Entry and Exit of Low-Fare Carriers, in ADVANCES IN AIRLINE ECONOMICS
(Darin Lee ed., 2006).
228. Id. at 1.
229. See id. Notice that this is not inconsistent with the “Southwest Effect”
documented by Goolsbee and Syverson because they considered the effect of
anticipated entry, which escapes the purview of Bamberger and Carltons’s data. See
generally Goolsbee & Syverson, supra note 99.
230. See Bamberger & Carlton, supra note 227.
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ambiguity on both sides of the Atlantic is probably benign. It appears
unlikely that the FSC carriers in Europe will engage in targeted attacks
on LCCs if for no other reason than a fear that DG Comp will follow
the lead of the Bundeskartellamt. Moreover, it appears unlikely that
EU Courts would find such an intervention illegal. And the prevailing
ambiguity on the western side of the Atlantic may be discouraging
possibly predatory behavior as well. The DOT’s legal position allows
for non-specific action against unspecified behavior, and there is no
recent indication that predatory behavior is seriously retarding the role
of low-cost carriers. All carriers know that nothing other than
Congressional action can prevent the DOT from intervening in a
particular situation if it chooses to do so, despite the difficulty of a
private claim. The usual national U.S. antitrust concern about sending
clear economy-wide signals simply does not apply. Similar to the
FTC’s use of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to attack Intel
and achieve a settlement in 2009 without setting a precedent for the
courts,231 the regulators can find an accommodation that does not
extend beyond airlines and creates no precedent for private action.
If the U.S. policy posture turned narrowly on below average
variable cost pricing and recoupment in a single market, then the
possibility of transatlantic conflict in cases involving possible
predation might well arise. But as the earlier discussion made clear,
the DOJ may have established in the American Airlines case that
recoupment can involve multiple markets. Moreover, while DOT’s
proposed solution to airline predation without a consideration of pricecost relations was rejected, it still retains great latitude in its regulation
of the industry for purposes of promoting competition.232 Put
otherwise, both of the relevant U.S. enforcers have a history of
pushing for close attention to predatory behavior and have been
frustrated by other judicial and political forces. A plausible inference
is that U.S. enforcers would be unlikely to object to strict EU
enforcement and that they would sympathize with EU concerns about
possible predatory behavior by U.S. firms.
I. Market Imperfections Connected with Airport Facilities
A major distinguishing feature of the airline industry globally is
its dependence on specific complementary inputs such as airports and
all measures for safety and security that are either publicly owned or
subject to extensive continuous public regulation.
231.
232.

GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 121.
See U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 203.
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As the discussion below shows, limits imposed by airport
facilities generate significant competitive effects at some U.S.
airports. The problem, where it occurs, arises because of a scarcity of
gates and slots (the use of airspace and ground facilities at a particular
time) disproportionally affecting LCCs attempting to compete with
legacy carriers.
Particularly in a comparative policy context, gates and slots must
be sharply distinguished. In the U.S., the disposition of both limited
gate space and slots have typically been subject to administrative rules
that have favored incumbents. In the U.S, but not in the EU, gates are
commonly leased to airlines under exclusive long-term leases.
Although the leasing airline sometimes subleases to other carriers for
short terms, this arrangement keeps ultimate control in the hands of
the long-term lessee. In the EU, the complex pattern of traffic
involving many more carriers at most airports than is typical in the
U.S has led to practices in which gates are now seldom controlled by
specific carriers.
In response to the concerns about entry in the 1990s, already
discussed, in 2000 Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation
and Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR-21).233 At
airports in which a single airline generated more than 50% of the
passenger volume, federal funding was to be contingent on the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) acceptance of a plan to increase
competition in order for the airport to be eligible for federal financial
aid.234 Empirical studies of the airports affected by that legislation,
before and after its passage, reveal some important findings. Prior to
the legislation, when the number of gates controlled by a carrier
increased from 10 to 30%, fares increased by 3% and prices were 2%
lower when sublease fees were controlled.235 And the price increases
became more severe with congestion, defined as the ratio of flights to
gates.236 Where there were 600 departures per gate per quarter, a 30%
difference in gates leased led to a 6% change in fare, whereas at onethird that level of congestion, the difference changed proportionally to
2%.237 This suggests that where the AIR-21 legislation was seriously
implemented, the impact on fares could have been substantial, and that

233. See Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century, Pub. L. No. 106-18, § 1, 114 Stat. 61, 61 (2000).
234. See id. § 155(b), 114 Stat. at 88.
235. Federico Ciliberto & Jonathan W. Williams, Limited Access to Airport
Facilities and Market Power in the Airline Industry, 53 J.L. & ECON. 467, 469 (2010).
236. See id.
237. Id.
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is what Snider and Williams found.238 Those airline markets that
included one airport that implemented an approved competition plan
experienced an average 13% price decline, and those markets with
such airports at both ends had a 20% decline.239 There was some
increased congestion but not enough to outweigh the gains from the
very substantial price drops. This points to the desirability of increased
airport facilities, but such expansion has been hindered by the $4.50
cap on federal passenger facility charges that has been in place since
2001.240 Large carriers have wanted neither an increased tax burden
nor greater ease of entry for competitive carriers.241
Another approach to increasing the effective capacity of airports
in the U.S. is the sharing of gates. As leases have expired, an
increasing number of U.S. airports have insisted on arrangements that
increase the effective number of gates by obliging carriers to share.242
Because gates in EU airports are generally not controlled by particular
carriers,243 airport-generated constraints on entry within the EU are
almost entirely due to the scarcity of slots. A sharp transatlantic
difference looms here. In the U.S., the so-called High Density Rule of
1969244 subjected five U.S. airports––Washington National (now
Reagan National), LaGuardia, Kennedy, Newark, and O’Hare––to slot
control, under which each airline had a fixed quota of takeoffs and
landings at specific times.245 Today only Reagan National is under
complete slot control, although the New York airports are subject to
intermittent control. The issue of slot scarcity has remained
sufficiently pressing, however, that as recently as the
United/Continental merger in 2010 and the American/US Air merger
in 2013, the Justice Department required extensive slot divestiture as
a condition of its approval of the mergers.246 The issue of slot scarcity
appears far more pressing in Europe where as many as eighty airports
have slot control, although often only for peak times of the day.247
238. See Connan Snider & Jonathan W. Williams, Barriers to Entry in the
Airline Industry: A Multidimensional Regression-Discontinuity Analysis of AIR-21,
97 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1002, 1002 (2015).
239. Id. at 1012.
240. See id. at 1003.
241. See id.
242. See Susan Stellin, Sharing Catches on at Airports, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/08/business/at-airports-a-new-strategy-iscatching-on-sharing.html [https://perma.cc/N9WZ-Q2WN].
243. See id.
244. See High Density Traffic Airports, 14 C.F.R. § 93.123 (1969).
245. See id.
246. See Kudrle & Gifford, supra note 64, at 572-75.
247. See James D. Reitzes et al., Competitive Effects of Exchanges or Sales of
Airport Landing Slots, 46 REV. INDEP. ORG. 95, 95-96 (2015). The study suggests high
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All EU airports are now subject to 2007-08 Commission rules
that favor entrants in the allocation of slots and condemn any
favoritism towards particular established carriers.248 This could be
bolstered further by legislation pending in the European Parliament.
One assessment notes: “It must also be pointed out that, even if the
new entrant rule has not been overall extremely successful at
promoting sustainable competition, it has made it possible for lowcost airlines such as Ryanair and especially EasyJet to achieve
significant growth at some congested airports.”249 In fact, an important
recent trend in the EU is the increased use of main hubs rather than
secondary airports by LCCs.250
Further alleviation of the slot scarcity problem could generate
further potential LCC competition in the EU. In the U.S., the problem
of slot scarcity appears to be centered on New York area airports and
on Reagan airport in Washington. Of these airports, Newark and
Kennedy service transatlantic flights. Emergent LCC transatlantic
competition could be affected at these airports.
The role of the private sector in airport ownership varies greatly
around the world. The current infrastructure of the U.S. air transport
system is funded by a combination of local and federal monies, some
of which come from airport use taxes and from bond issues.251 The
bonds have sometimes been purchased by airlines, which can then
enable them to exercise influence (“right in interest”) over airport
expansion activity that could facilitate entry.252 In Canada, airports are
leased by the federal government to not-for-profit private
management, while in France and Germany, the government has
social gains from increasing the use of slot control at more U.S. airports. See generally
id.
248. EU governance of slot allocation dates back to Council Regulation 95/93
of January 18th, 1993. See generally Council Regulation 95/93, 1993 O.J. (L 14).
Regulation 95/93 was amended by Regulation 793/2004, which contained provisions
dealing with problems faced by new entrants. See Council Regulation 793/2004, 2004
O.J. (L 138) 50. Commission Communications in 2007 and 2008 effectively
strengthened the position of new entrants. More recently, the Commission has
proposed a recast of the slot regulation designed to help new entrants gain access to
slots at congested airports. See generally also Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on Common Rules for the Allocation of Slots
at European Union Airports, COM (2011) 827 final (Jan. 12, 2011).
249. See Andrea Ranieri et al., Airport Slot Allocation: Performance of the
Current System and Options for Reform, SESAR (Nov. 26, 2013),
https://www.sesarju.eu/newsroom/brochures-publications/airport-slot-allocationperformance-current-system-and-options [https://perma.cc/D4F7-ULFB].
250. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 27-28.
251. See David Gillen, The Evolution of Airport Ownership and Governance,
17 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 3, 4 (2011).
252. See MORTON ET AL., supra note 83, at 43.
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typically retained majority ownership.253 In Denmark, Austria, and
Switzerland, private interests are controlling.254 In the UK, nearly
every airport is private and operates at a moderate profit without
regulation.255 In 2016, 47% of all European airports were “mostly” or
“fully” private; this was a huge increase over the 23% figure in 2010.256
Airport ownership has seen less change in the U.S. than almost
anywhere due to the exemption of public bonding from federal
taxation as well as the federal subsidies already noted.257
Much of the large literature on the ownership and regulation of
airports in recent years focuses on production efficiency, but
competition issues are also considered.258 Gillen stresses that airports
are an important example of a two-sided market: air passage on the
one hand and all of the commercial activity in the airport on the
other.259 In such a market, the volume of transactions depends on the
structure as well as the level of fees.260 In particular, this dissolves any
simple welfare relation between price and cost for a particular activity
because of the externalities generated by the various prices across the
platform.261 Intuitively, however, this still means that whatever is
produced should take place at the lowest level of real cost and that
consideration coupled with the pricing complications introduced by
the two-sided market has drawn many observers to favor only light
regulation of airports.262 This may, in some circumstances, create a
tension between maximum opportunity for entrants and various
financial commitments from established carriers.263 But, whatever the
ownership structure, there is nearly always some public oversight, and
that oversight, not just in North America and Europe but in many other
253. See Gillen, supra note 251, at 4, 5.
254. See id. at 4.
255. See David Starkie, The Airport Industry in a Competitive Environment:
A United Kingdom Perspective, in OECD/ITF JOINT TRANSPORT RESEARCH CENTRE
DISCUSSION PAPERS 1, 7, 14 (2008).
256. See AIRPORTS COUNCIL INT’L EUR., THE OWNERSHIP OF EUROPE’S
AIRPORTS 4 (2016).
257. See Robert Poole & Chris Edwards, Privatizing U.S. Airports, 76 CATO
INST. TAX & BUDGET BULL. 1, 1-2 (2016) (explaining that the U.S. also lags behind
most of the developed world by continuing to employ a public traffic control system).
258. See, e.g., Peter Forsyth, Airport Policy in Australia and New Zealand:
Privatization, Light-Handed Regulation, and Performance, in AVIATION
INFRASTRUCTURE PERFORMANCE: A STUDY IN COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY 65
(Clifford Winston & Ginés de Rus eds., 2009).
259. See Gillen, supra note 251, at 12.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 8.
262. See id. at 9.
263. See id. at 12-13.
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parts of the world as well, typically features access for entrants as a
major and growing concern.264
The intent of Congress, the DOT, and the DOJ to promote
maximum gate and slot availability in the U.S. is clear and consistent,
but the effectuation of those goals lies with the myriad public
authorities that control the operation and expansion of U.S. airports.
One generalization appears safe: Nearly all U.S. airport managements
now recognize that public interest demands demonstrated attention to
the promotion of competition, and positive action seems to be growing
almost everywhere. In the EU, dedicated gates are not common, but
slot favoritism based on historic use prevails in many places.
Nonetheless, complaints by disfavored airlines appear to generate
intervention.265 The EU has decided that airports are “undertakings”
that must be run as commercial enterprises, and an element of that
behavior must be nondiscrimination among carriers.266 Sluggishness
in slot availability continues to impede entry in the EU but it is not an
insurmountable barrier.267 While fully functional slot trading is not yet
the norm, it represents a feasible public policy goal on both sides of
the Atlantic.268
III. POLICY COMPATIBILITY IN A WORLD OF NATIONAL INDUSTRIES
The discussion so far has considered U.S. and EU developments
as parallel phenomena along with some considerations of policy
congruence.269 But airlines are subject to unusual restrictions about
national ownership and operations. The competitive significances of
these considerations need explicit attention.

264. See id.
265. See Jaap G. de Wit, Unlevel Playing Field? Ah Yes, You Mean
Protectionism, 41 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 22, 22-23 (2014).
266. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 35.
267. de Wit, supra note 265, at 28 (“Even at the most congested airport in
Europe, Heathrow, Emirates has been able to acquire the necessary slots, be it at a
substantial price.”).
268. See Jan Brueckner, Airport Congestion Management: Prices or
Quantities?, 35 ACCESS 10, 10-14 (2009). Brueckner explores both congestion fees
and slot trading and concludes that, while the determination of the optimal number of
slots at congested airports will never be ideal, optimal congestion fees would not be
politically feasible because they would be lower for larger airport users who would be
able to internalize some of their own congestion. See id. He concludes that slot trading
can work quite well, although he suggests improvements including a web-based
clearing house that would hide the identities of buyers and sellers to replace bilateral
trading. See id.
269. See supra Part II.
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A. Airlines as an International Industry
The 1944 Chicago Convention saw a confident U.S. favoring a
major role for markets in international air transport, while the rest of
world, and notably Europe, feared U.S. domination. Much has been
written here about the distinctive characteristics of airlines, but trade
in air services shares two principal characteristics with other
international trade. First, there is a general presumption in economics
that the lowest cost provider globally will best serve national
purchasers and, second, that vulnerable national providers will use any
and all arguments and influence to stave off foreign competition.
The nascent airline industry in many countries began between
the world wars in an environment of national security concerns about
the emerging significance of air power and often with strong economic
encouragement to source aircraft nationally. Air power played an
important role in World War I and was certain to be critical in any
future conflict. In addition, national airlines needed to be a dependable
resource for national security purposes and for other emergency
deployment. And from the beginning there was a critical concern for
safety. This concern, too, argued for keeping control as reliable and
transparent as possible––and thus restriction to nationals.270 These
concerns were codified in American New Deal legislation restricting
foreign ownership,271 and similar restrictions were adopted in most
other countries.272
As post-war air traffic grew, it was quickly recognized that most
high-income countries had comparably effective airline safety
standards. And economies of scale—and particularly of accumulated
output273—drove most national aircraft manufacturers from the
market, thus removing another rationale for protection. But this still
left the national “flag carriers” in many European states as proud,
usually government owned, national symbols and often influential
lobbies for an essentially mercantilist policy.274 Bilateral agreements
were struck that typically closely balanced national access offered for
the foreign access gained.275 This, of course, completely ignores the
objectives of air travelers and others who gain from cheaper
international travel to more destinations. The stylized history of recent
270. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 52.
271. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, § 501, 52 Stat.
973, 1005-07 (1938).
272. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 52.
273. See generally T.P. Wright, Factors Affecting the Cost of Airplanes, 3 J.
AERONAUTICAL SCI. 122, 122-28 (1936) (discussing this concept).
274. See Burghouwt, et al., supra note 2, at 7.
275. See id.
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decades finds increasing policy dominance of this latter group.
Nevertheless, the industry has remained singular in many respects
including its almost complete detachment from the various
liberalizations under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and, more recently, the World Trade Organization’s General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).276
B. The Many “Freedoms”
The language of international air transport liberalization
employs nine categories of “freedom,” only the first two of which have
been largely non-controversial throughout. The original five
“freedoms” entered public discourse at the 1944 Chicago Convention,
which generated a Two Freedoms Agreement277 and a Five Freedoms
Agreement.278 Although the U.S. initially endorsed the ambitious Five
Freedoms Agreement, it ultimately withdrew from it, perhaps because
it reduced the leverage that the Americans would have in bilateral
deals. After the U.S. withdrew, the pursuit of multilateralism
floundered, and the nations of the world pursued a mercantilist
aviation policy.279
Over time other freedoms have been added to the five identified
at the Convention.280 The first freedom is simply the right by a flight
originating in B to fly over national territory of A.281 The second
freedom is the right of flights from B to land for maintenance and
refueling in A.282 The third and fourth freedoms are the right of airlines
in A to take passengers to B and vice versa.283 The fifth freedom is the
right of a B-based carrier to pick up or deliver passengers from third276. See BRIAN F. HAVEL, BEYOND OPEN SKIES: A NEW REGIME FOR
INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 526-28 (2009). The GATS of 1995, one of the basic treaties
of the World Trade Organization, recognized the obduracy of these special
characteristics and completely omitted flight services from its very limited and highly
qualified coverage of air travel services. See id. at 526 n.31. A certain limited
subsectors of non-flight air service activities have been considered. See id.
277. International Air Services Transit Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 1,
59 Stat. 1693, 84 U.N.T.S. 389.
278. International Air Transport Agreement, Dec. 7, 1944, art. 1, § 1, 59 Stat.
1701, 171 U.N.T.S. 387.
279. Brian F. Havel & Gabriel S. Sanchez, Restoring Global Aviation’s
“Cosmopolitan Mentalité”, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 12-14 (2011).
280. See Freedoms of the Air, INT’L CIV. AVIATION ORG. (last visited Oct. 22,
2018), https://www.icao.int/Pages/freedomsAir.aspx [https://perma.cc/W7WXCWYB].
281. See id.
282. See id.
283. See id.
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country airports to an airport in A.284 The sixth freedom is the right of
a carrier from B to use one of B’s airports as a link between third-party
traffic and an airport in A.285 The seventh freedom in the right of an
airline in A to move traffic between countries B and C completely
unconnected with origin or destination in A.286 The eighth freedom is
the granting of a right by A for an airline from B to move passengers
between designated airports in A so long as the flight either begins or
ends in B.287 Finally, the ninth freedom is complete nondiscrimination—cabotage: the ability of a foreign airline to move
passengers from one national airport to another without restriction.288
Convinced of the competitive potential of its own carriers, to
meet the increasing demands of its high income travelling public and
to promote more foreign expenditure in the U.S., the Carter
Administration pursued bilateral, open skies agreements that aimed to
make supply and demand the principal drivers of both air fares and
flight frequency. The first agreement, with the Netherlands, came into
force in 1992; it gave unrestricted landing rights on its soil to airlines
registered in the other country.289 Many similar agreements
followed.290 The most recent significant U.S. agreement was with
Japan in 2010. Other bilateral and multilateral agreements elsewhere
in the world in recent years not involving the United States have
followed the open skies pattern.291
The most comprehensive agreement so far was struck by the
U.S. and the EU in 2007.292 It opened all U.S. and EU airports to all

284. See id.
285. See id.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id. Our emphasis throughout this Article is passenger traffic, but, with
some exceptions, the freedoms from various bilateral and multilateral agreements
apply to cargo traffic as well. Although cargo carried by passenger planes brings
significant revenue, cargo service is typically not considered together with passenger
service because shippers are in a completely different market position. They consider
alternative modes of transport quite differently from passengers and there are many
air carriers––both domestic and international––that serve cargo shipment exclusively.
289. See Countries with Bilateral Open Skies Agreements, U.S. DEPT. OF
TRANS. (Mar. 11, 2015), https://www.transportation.gov/policy/aviationpolicy/countries-bilateral-open-skies-agreements [https://perma.cc/9S5Y-2RAU].
290. See id.
291. See generally Clifford Winston & Jia Yan, Open Skies: Estimating
Travelers’ Benefits from Free Trade in Airline Services, 7 AM. ECON. J. 370 (2015).
292. See generally U.S.-EU AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT OF APR. 30, 2007,
U.S.
DEP’T
ST.,
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/114872.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MQM2-2DTX].
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U.S. and EU airlines.293 Moreover, it promised a range of cooperative
activity on many matters including competition policy.294
A recent study by Winston and Yan estimates a huge saving from
the U.S. open skies agreements up to 2015.295 Their simulations find
at least $4 billion in annual gains to purchasers in the affected
markets.296 They estimate that another $4 billion gain could be
achieved if similar agreements could be struck between the U.S. and
all other significant national airline markets.297
C. From Ownership Restrictions to Alliances
One of the most challenging policy issues today, the proper
treatment of “alliances,” grows directly from the national roots of the
Chicago Convention of 1944, which, despite considerable
liberalization, still prevails. Although recent bilateral agreements are
far more market-oriented than in earlier decades, aviation remains a
singular industry in its almost universal rejection of controlling
foreign ownership of domestically-registered airlines and its granting
of cabotage only to those airlines.298 Liberalization has been modest:
The 2007 U.S–EU Agreement relaxed some ownership restrictions,
maintaining a 25% ceiling on voting equity and a 49.9% ceiling on
total equity but with the additional provision that more than 50%
ownership would be considered on a case-by-case basis.299

293. See id. at 10; see also Button, supra note 18, at 59.
294. See generally U.S.-EU AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT OF APR. 30, 2007,
supra note 292.
295. See Winston & Yan, supra note 291, at 370.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Very few national political figures in any country have favored cabotage.
One exception was the Canadian Competition Commissioner Sheridan Scott in 2008.
See Paul Waldie & Heather Scoffield, Ottawa Urged to Unshackle Business, GLOBE
& MAIL, June 27, 2008, at B1. From the standpoint of economic welfare, the
Commissioner might have been relatively unconcerned about the fate of the chronic
loss-making Air Canada and more concerned with the almost certainly cheaper prices
that would have subsequently been offered to the Canadian public. The suggestion did
not prosper. The United States would never consider such a unilateral move because
the absence of cabotage in the world’s largest single air market gives it great leverage
over others in prying open their markets. This, of course, parallels the “bargaining
tariff” discussed in economics textbooks: If such leverage didn’t exist––as it doesn’t
for Canada––national economic welfare might well be served by some version of
cabotage legalization.
299. U.S.-EU AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT OF APR. 30, 2007, supra note 292,
at Annex 4.
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Unsurprisingly, the airlines have sought ways to extend the
range of their markets by working around ownership restrictions.300
Alliances are agreements that have developed in the airline industry
that involve various forms of cooperation.301 This cooperation can vary
from basic arms-length arrangements involving code-sharing, lounge
access, and/or frequent-flyer programs to highly integrated joint
ventures in which the parties share revenues or profits.302 At present,
there are three major alliances: Star Alliance, SkyTeam, and
oneworld.303 The degrees of cooperation vary within each of the major
alliances.304 Thus there are twenty-six members of the Star Alliance
but only three members participate in that alliance’s joint venture (Air
Canada, Lufthansa, and United).305 Similarly, there are twelve
members of SkyTeam but only three in that alliance’s joint venture
(Air France-KLM, Alitalia, and Delta).306 Finally, there are eleven
members of oneworld but only three in oneworld’s joint venture
(American, BA, and Iberia).307 Competitive concerns focus mainly on
the joint ventures that involve profit sharing.308
In an alliance involving a profit-sharing joint venture, the
partners’ shares of the venture’s profits are not affected by the
ownership of the planes employed on any given flight.309 The airlines
refer to such alliances as “metal neutral” in the sense that the parties
are indifferent to the passengers’ choices of carrier for any and all of
the venture’s flights.310 Their sole interest is in the maximization of the
venture’s profits.311
D. U.S. Alliance Policy
The DOT possesses the authority to grant immunity from the
antitrust laws to airline agreements that it finds not contrary to the
public interest and must disapprove of any agreement “that
300. See EUR. COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TRANSATLANTIC AIRLINE
ALLIANCES: COMPETITIVE ISSUES AND REGULATORY APPROACHES 3 (2010),
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/transport/reports/joint_alliance_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JXM2-XV2C] [hereinafter EC/DOT REPORT].
301. See id. at 5.
302. See id. at 4.
303. Id.
304. See id. at 5.
305. Id. at 7.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. at 9.
309. See id. at 7.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 8-9.
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substantially reduces or eliminates competition” unless the
Transportation Secretary determines that the agreement “is necessary
to meet a serious transportation need or to achieve important public
benefits.”312 The DOT has been using this authority to approve various
alliances since 1992 and has granted immunity to the three main
alliances: SkyTeam,313 Star Alliance,314 and oneworld.315 Like the DOJ
in approving some recent mergers, the DOT has required releases of
slots as a condition of granting alliance antitrust immunity.316 In the
case of the oneworld alliance, for example, the DOJ required that slots
at London’s Heathrow airport, a slot-constrained airport, be released
as a condition of granting antitrust immunity.317
E. EU Alliance Policy
The European Commission regularly assesses mergers in the
airline industry, such as the attempts by Ryanair to acquire Aer
Lingus, which was found to involve excessive reduction of
competition on the same routes.318 Under EU competition law, airline
alliances are generally viewed as contractual arrangements involving
less integration than a merger.319 Accordingly, they are governed by
Article 101 of the Treaty and Functioning of the European Union
(Article 101) and only rarely by the Merger Regulation.320 Their
evaluation follows the structure of that Article: Under Article 101’s
first clause, an assessment is made of the competitive effects of the
transaction under review.321 If the agreement or practice is determined
to lessen competition, then the analysis proceeds to a second step in
312. 49 U.S.C. § 41309 (2012).
313. See AIRLINE ALLIANCES OPERATING WITH ANTITRUST IMMUNITY, DEP’T
TRANSP. 1, https://cms.dot.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/mission/office-policy/
aviation-policy/9906/170104-all-immunized-alliances-05102017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8HP3-9FYC].
314. See id.
315. See id.
316. See EC/DOT REPORT, supra note 300, at 15.
317. See DEP’T OF TRANSP., DOCKET DOT-OST-2008-0252 15-20 (July 20,
2010),
http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostpdf78/834.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CX5RAEHL].
318. Commission Regulation 139/2004 of Feb. 27, 2013, Merger Procedure:
Case No. COMP/M.6663-RyanAir/Aer Lingus III, art. 8(3), O.J. (L 1106) 20, 36.
319. See Council Regulation 4064/89, art. 3.2, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 4 (EEC).
320. See generally id. (treating a joint venture between KLM and Alitalia that
included almost all of their operations as a merger, and thus subject to the Merger
Regulation).
321. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 101(1), May 9, 2008, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 88-89 [hereinafter
TFEU].
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which an assessment is made of the resulting efficiencies and whether
those efficiencies are great enough to offset the reduction in
competition.322 This format is the one that would presumably be used
in the evaluation of air carrier alliances, should a formal proceeding
involving alliances proceed to conclusion. But, as we will see,
proceedings involving alliances tend not to reach the point where the
Commission makes formal conclusions of fact or law.
The Commission’s powers over air transport have evolved
unevenly, reaching apparent maturity only in 2004 in Regulation
411/2004.323 Before 2004, the Commission’s authority over
international air transport was not broadly spelled out. In most of the
areas in which the Commission enforces competition law, it acts under
regulations authorizing it to investigate and impose penalties;
respondents’ rights to be heard are also guaranteed.324 In 1962,
however, the Council ruled that Regulation 17/62,325 which gave this
authorization for the Commission generally, did not apply to
transport.326 As a result, the Council began to issue a series of
regulations providing the Commission with the needed authority over
particular forms of transport. The Council acted on inland transport
(rail, road, and inland waterways) in 1968,327 maritime transport in
1986,328 and air transport internal to the EU in 1986.329 But only in 2004
was international air transport (between the EU and other nations)
added.330 The Commission reviewed international airline agreements
for many years before it was given specific authority over the air

322. See id. art. 101(3).
323. See Council Regulation 411/2004, art. 1, 2004 O.J. (L 68) 1, 2 (EC)
(repealing Council Regulation 3975/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1 (EEC) and amending
Council Regulation 3976/87, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 9 (EEC) and Council Regulation
1/2003, art. 32, 2002 O.J. (L 1) 1, 21 (EC) in connection with air transport between
the Community and third countries).
324. See Council Regulation 17/62, art. 3, 19, 1962 O.J. (L 17) 87, 88, 92
(EC). This Regulation has been superseded by Council Regulation 1/2003. See
Council Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 1 (EC).
325. See Council Regulation 17/62, art. 3, 19.
326. See Council Regulation 141/62, art. 1, 1962 O.J. (L 2751) 291 (EC)
(deciding that Council Regulation No. 17/62 did not apply to transport services). The
Council was apparently concerned with the preservation of collective rate-setting,
common control over supply, and market sharing agreements.
327. See Council Regulation 1017/68, art. 1, 1968 O.J. (L 175) 302, 304 (EC).
328. See Council Regulation 4056/86, art. 1, 1986 O.J. (L 378) 4, 5 (EEC).
329. See Council Regulation 3975/87, art. 1, 1987 O.J. (L 374) 1, 2 (EEC).
330. See Council Regulation 487/2009, art. 2, 2009 O.J. (L 148) 1, 2 (EC)
(repealing Council Regulation 3976/87 and extending Commission jurisdiction to air
transport both within the EU and beyond it).
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transport sector.331 The Commission had been reviewing and
approving airline alliances conditioned on the release of slots by the
alliance members since 1998 when it approved a 1996 alliance
between American Airlines and British Airways.332 In 2002, it
approved a transatlantic alliance between Northwest Airlines and
KLM333 and an alliance among Lufthansa, SAS, and United Airlines.334
Changes in the EU’s procedures for the enforcement of
competition law have impacted the Commission’s approach to airline
alliances. As noted above, Article 101’s first clause appears to cast a
wide net, prohibiting all agreements and concerted practices that affect
competition among the Member States.335 Article 101’s third clause,
however, provides for exemptions from these prohibitions for
agreements that enhance efficiency.336 At least initially, the invocation
of Article 101’s third clause was understood to require specific action
by the Commission. This form of regulation underlies Council
Regulation No. 17/62,337 which requires the Commission’s approval
for the validation of agreements.
The European authorities soon discovered that this ex ante
method of administration overtaxed the Commission’s resources. The
result was Council Regulation No. 19/65, under which the
Commission was authorized to issue so-called bloc exemptions for all
agreements and concerted practices that fit defined categories.338
Formally, the administration of competition law continued to adhere
to an ex ante enforcement model (requiring advance Commission
approval), although firms were allowed to self-apply the bloc
exemptions. In 2003, however, the Council moved to an ex post model
where Commission action takes place after the fact. Under Council
Regulation No. 1/2003, agreements and concerted practices of
331. See generally id.; Monique Negenman, Commission Closes Investigation
into Lufthansa/SAS/United Airlines and KLM/Northwest Alliances, COMPETITION
POL’Y NEWSLETTER (Competition Directorate-General of the European Commission,
Brussels), Spring 2003.
332. See European Commission Press Release IP/98/641, European
Commission, Commission Publishes its Conditions for Approving the British
Airways/American Airlines Air Alliance, (Jul. 8, 1998) (announcing preliminary
approval of the Alliance).
333. See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines, Inc., COM (2002) D-2/36.111 (July 30, 2002).
334. See Negenman, supra note 331, at 70.
335. See TFEU, supra note 321, art. 1041(1).
336. See id. art. 101(3).
337. See Council Regulation 17/62, 1962 J.O (L 17) 87.
338. See Council Regulation 19/65, 1965 J.O. (553) 36, 37. See generally id.
for an application of Article 85 of the Treaty to certain categories of agreements and
concerted practices.
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business firms are deemed prima facie lawful and must be challenged
by the Commission (which bears the burden of proof)339 and ruled in
violation of Article 101 before they are deemed unlawful. Regulation
No. 1/2003 also authorizes the Commission to accept commitments of
parties, making them legally binding and obviating the grounds for
enforcement action.340 In cases in which the Commission accepts
commitments from the parties, Regulation No. 1/2003 contemplates
that there is no need for the Commission to reach a conclusion as to
whether there is, or has been, a violation.341
These enforcement changes become manifest for airlines in
Council Regulation No. 487/2009, which authorizes the Commission
to adopt regulations over air transport (including international air
transport), involving, inter alia, joint planning and coordination of
airline schedules and consultation on tariffs for the carriage of
passengers and joint operations on “new less busy” scheduled air
services.342
These regulations now inform the Commission’s general
approval of alliances in return for the airlines releasing slots at
congested airports. The Commission appears to believe that the best
way to foster competition in the airline industry lies in the removal of
barriers to entry and that divesting slots from FSCs and making them
available to LCCs is the most promising technique for achieving this
goal. So far the Commission has been pursuing this goal through
negotiation. Regulation 1/2003 fosters negotiation by reducing the
confrontational relationship between the Commission and its
negotiating partners in several ways. First, because Regulation 1/2003
has adopted an ex post model of enforcement, the parties are
presumptively acting lawfully and can enter into agreements with the
Commission without destroying that presumption. Second, the
regulation allows the parties to make binding commitments without an
admission or a finding of violation. Thus, the parties can commit to
freeing up slots without admitting that their prior (or present) behavior
was (or is) unlawful. And a Commission ruling condemning their
behavior is unnecessary to make their commitments legally binding.
Regulation 487/2009 also shapes enforcement. It confers on the
Commission the authority to bloc-exempt by category a range of
agreements from the prohibitions of Article 101(1) because they are
339.
of proof in
defense.
340.
341.
342.

See Commission Regulation 1/2003, art. 2, 2003 J.O. (L 1) 8. The burden
Article 101(3) issues, however, is on the party asserting the efficiency
See id. art. 9; see also id. pmbl. cl. 13.
See id. pmbl. cl. 13.
See Council Regulation 487/ 2009, art. 2, 2009 J.O. (L 148) 1, 2.
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efficiency-enhancing and therefore justified under Article 101(3).343
Whether it is necessary to issue bloc exemptions under the new ex post
regime established by Council Regulation No. 1/2003 is a moot point
because the Council has continued to authorize the Commission to
issue bloc exemptions, and the Commission has complied.344
The kinds of agreements favored by Regulation 487 include joint
planning and coordination of airline schedules;345 consultation on fares
for the carriage of passengers and baggage and of freight on scheduled
air services; and joint operations on new “less busy” scheduled air
services.346 This structure implies that the Council sees these kinds of
agreements—or versions of them—as at least potentially efficiency
enhancing. Agreements involving joint planning and coordination of
schedules and consultation on prices are part of current major airline
alliances.
From the perspective of the issues connected with modern airline
alliances, the Regulation’s reference to agreements involving joint
operations on new “less busy” scheduled air services is somewhat
puzzling because current alliances involve joint operations on very
busy scheduled air services. It is possible that the Council meant to
disapprove these alliances, but that is unlikely because the
Commission has already given its approval to several of them.347
Rather, the Regulation is probably intended to require the Commission
to examine joint operations on a case-by-case basis instead of
regulating them categorically.
The Commission approved of an alliance among Air France
(which had already merged with KLM), Alitalia, and Delta in 2015,348
and it approved of an alliance involving Continental, United,
Lufthansa, and Air Canada in 2013.349 Earlier, the Commission
343. See id. For example, the Commission has long issued bloc exemptions
applicable to vertical restrictions under Council Regulation 2790/1999. See
Commission Regulation No. 2790/1999, 1999 O.J. (L 336) 21 (EC). And the Council
renewed the Commission’s power to exempt vertical restrictions in Council
Regulation No. 330/2010 when Regulation 2790 was about to expire. See
Commission Regulation No. 330/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 102) 1 (EU).
344. See Council Regulation No. 487/2009, 2009 O.J. (L 148) 1 (EC).
345. See id.
346. See id.
347. See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines, Inc., 2002 O.J. (C 181) 3.
348. See Summary of Commission Decision of 12 May 2015 Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Case AT.39964 — Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Delta), 2015 O.J. (C 212) 5.
349. See Summary of Commission Decision of 23 May 2013 Relating to a
Proceeding Under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Case AT.39595 — Continental/United/Lufthansa/Air Canada), 2013 O.J. (C 201) 6.
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approved an alliance between Air France and Alitalia in 2004350 and
alliances between KLM and Northwest Airlines351 and among
Lufthansa, SAS, and United in 2002.352 The Commission upheld an
alliance between KLM and Alitalia under the Merger Regulation in
1999.353
Since 2004, the Commission has first tentatively found that the
alliance it was reviewing impeded competition in violation of Article
101(1). It then reassessed that conclusion in the light of commitments
made by the parties to divest slots at congested airports. In the light of
these commitments, the Commission then concluded that a requisite
degree of competition was being maintained without further formal
remedies.354 This is contemplated by Regulation 1/2003 in which the
Commission obtains results that it desires without making a formal
determination of a violation.355 But when the Commission is acting
under Regulation 487, its authority comes ultimately from Article
101(3) whose application is the subject of Regulation 487.356 So, the
Commission’s approval of the alliance in question must be based on
the efficiencies generated by the alliance. It is not entirely clear why
the release of slots (which has to do with engendering future
competition) constitutes an efficiency generated by the alliance and
thus grounds for its approval. This largely theoretical difficulty stems
350. See Commission Decision of 7 April 2004 Relating to a Proceeding
Pursuant to Article 81 of the EC Treaty Concerning Case COMP/A.38284/D2 —
Société Air France/Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SpA, 2004 O.J. (L 362) 17.
351. See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines and Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra note 347.
352. See Commission Notice Concerning the Alliance Between Lufthansa,
SAS and United Airlines (Cases COMP/D-2/36.201, 36.076, 36.078 — procedure
under Article 85 (ex 89) EC), 2002 O.J. (C 181) 2; Negenman, supra note 331.
353. See Non-opposition to a Notified Concentration (Case COMP/JV.19 —
KLM/Alitalia, 2000 O.J. (C 96) 5 (indicating that the Commission did not oppose the
concentration between Alitalia and KLM).
354. The Commission followed this scenario in approving Star Alliance in
2013 and in approving SkyTeam in 2015. In approving oneworld in 2010, the
Commission also followed this scenario except that its approval took the form of
simply closing its investigation. See Commission Decision of 12 May 2015 relating
to proceedings under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union (Case AT.39964 – Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Delta) (Sky Team); Commission
Decision of 23 May 2013 relating to proceedings under Article 101 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39595 – Air Canada/United
Airlines, Inc./Deutsche Lufthansa AG)(Star Alliance); Joaquin Almunia Press
Release, Jul. 14, 2010, British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia Transatlantic
Alliance (announcing EU Commission’s closing of its investigation of the
transatlantic alliance involving British Airways, American Airlines and Iberia)
(oneworld).
355. See Council Regulation No. 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L 1) 3 (EC).
356. See Council Regulation No. 497/2009, 2009 O.J. (L148) 1 (EC).
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from the bifurcated structure of Article 101 that formally requires
separate determinations of competitive impact and newly generated
efficiencies.
F. Comparing the Treatment of Alliances in the U.S. and the EU
As suggested above, the growth of strong LCC competition in
both the U.S. and the EU has affected the competitive stance of the
enforcement agencies in both jurisdictions. The largest air carriers in
both the U.S and the EU are LCCs: Southwest Airlines and Ryanair.357
The expansion of the LCCs in the U.S. domestic market has been
dramatic, and they are currently exerting significant downward
pressure on the pricing of legacy carriers.358 Similar effects are
generated by Ryanair and other LCCs on the pricing of FSCs in the
EU. As we have argued elsewhere, the increased competitive pressure
from the LCCs was probably a major factor influencing the DOJ to
approve the recent mergers by the legacy carriers.359 Now the LCCs
are about to enter the transatlantic market. Some LCCs such as WOW!
and Norwegian Air have entered, or are about to enter, that market,
and Ryanair is exploring the possibility of entry.360 The DOT and the
European Commission undoubtedly see the entry of LCCs into the
transatlantic market as likely to exert downward pressure on fares.
This leads to their emphasis on slots to maximize the ease of entry into
a set of markets, presumably including those across the Atlantic.
The DOT has granted antitrust immunity to the three major
alliances.361 In the case of oneworld, the DOT required the parties to
divest some slots for the benefit of LCCs.362 The European
Commission has also granted approval to the three major alliances
after extracting commitments from the alliances to divest slots for the
benefit of LCCs in congested airports.363 It appears therefore that the
357. See Burghouwt et al., supra note 2.
358. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 574.
359. See id. at 563.
360. See Pamela Newenham & Mary Minihan, Ryanair’s Board Approves
Transatlantic Flights, IRISH TIMES (Mar. 16, 2015), https://www.irishtimes.com/
business/transport-and-tourism/ryanair-s-board-approves-transatlantic-flights1.2141529 [https://perma.cc/G99T-UKFD].
361. See AIRLINE ALLIANCES OPERATING WITH ANTITRUST IMMUNITY, supra
note 313, at 1.
362. See William Gillespie & Oliver M. Richard, Antitrust Immunity and
International Airlines Alliances 18 (Econ. Analysis Grp., Discussion Paper 11-1,
2011).
363. See Commission Decision of 12 May 2015 relating to proceedings under
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Case AT.39964
– Air France/KLM/Alitalia/Delta); Commission Decision of 23 May 2013 relating to
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European Commission, the DOT, and the DOJ all see the emergence
of strong LCCs as a major path to fostering greater competition in the
airline industry. Although the DOT’s understanding of the competitive
impact of airline cooperation is broader than that of the Commission
(and of the DOJ) in the sense that the DOT can take into account
competitive effects beyond a relevant antitrust market on which the
Commission (and the DOJ) would focus, the Commission and the
DOT both recognize the important role played by LCCs and the need
to foster LCC competition by reducing the barriers to market entry that
arise from slot scarcity. As a result, both agencies take a common
approach toward slot divesture at congested airports and generally
reach consistent results. This compatibility is reflected in their 2010
joint report on airline alliances.364 And it is also compatible with the
logic of DOJ’s three major recent merger approvals.365
The growth of strong LCC competition in both the U.S. and the
EU has affected the way that the enforcement agencies in both
jurisdictions approach the evaluation of alliances and mergers in the
airline industry. The actual and/or potential increase in LCC
competition has reduced the anticompetitive effects likely to be
generated by the joint operations taking place in each of the three
major alliances. This growing LCC competition has enabled the
agencies to more readily recognize enhancements of product quality,
such as network expansions and increased flights as well the cost
savings generated by the integrations.
The alliances appear to generate significant efficiencies of
density, scale, and scope. They can also eliminate the double
marginalization that would prevail without inter-airline cooperation.366
Among the scholars evaluating the effects of alliances on interline
passengers are Brueckner and Whalen367 who, in their model, highlight
welfare gains by passengers traveling beyond the partners’ hubs that
are likely to outweigh contrary effects on hub-to-hub travelers.368 But
this particular efficiency was recently challenged by Gillespie and
proceedings under Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
(Case AT.39595 – Air Canada/United Airlines, Inc./Deutsche Lufthansa AG);
Joaquin Almunia Press Release, Jul. 14, 2010, British Airways, American Airlines
and Iberia Transatlantic Alliance (announcing EU Commission’s closing of its
investigation of the transatlantic alliance involving British Airways, American
Airlines and Iberia).
364. See EC/DOT REPORT, supra note 300, at 1.
365. See Gifford & Kudrle, supra note 3, at 572-75.
366. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
367. Jan K. Brueckner & W. Tom Whalen, The Price Effects of Airline
Alliances, 43 J.L. & ECON. 503, 539-42 (2000).
368. See id. at 539.
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Richard, who claimed that airlines could apportion revenue between
cooperating airlines through arms-length bargaining,369 although this
alternative would probably generate additional transactions costs.
Gillespie and Richard are thus questioning whether the elimination of
double marginalization is a “merger specific” efficiency under the
merger guidelines.370 Yet the elimination of double marginalization is
widely recognized as an efficiency in vertical mergers involving
distribution, where arms-length bargaining is also a theoretical
alternative.371 Both the DOJ and the European Commission so
recognize it. Perhaps the merger guidelines are adverting to such
issues when they state that “[t]he Agencies do not insist upon a less
restrictive alternative that is merely theoretical.”372
Whether joint-venture operation is necessary to prevent double
marginalization, the alliances appear to generate the other efficiencies
mentioned.373 Carriers can serve more markets when they act
cooperatively, filling a larger aircraft with passengers that otherwise
would be divided among the separate airlines composing the
alliance.374 Hub-and-spoke organization, as is common in the airlines
and other modes of transportation, helps reduce average trip costs,375
and the more spokes serving the hub, the stronger are the likely
economies of scope. Such efficiencies can offset increases in price that
result from consolidation and cooperation, if the efficiencies are
sufficiently large.376 So, both the downward pressure on prices
resulting from LCC competition and cognizable efficiencies from firm
consolidation or cooperation appear critical to airline antitrust
evaluation.377

369. See Gillespie & Richard, supra note 59, at 458. They also claim that
empirical evidence shows that antitrust immunity is unnecessary to deal with double
marginalization. See id. at 457-65.
370. The merger guidelines of the DOJ and FTC require that efficiencies be
“merger specific.” See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6,
at 30 (requiring that efficiencies be “merger specific”).
371. See Gillespie & Richard, supra note 59, at 458.
372. See U.S. DEPT OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 30.
373. See Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Airline Alliances and
Antitrust Policy: The Role of Efficiencies, 21 J. AIR TRANSP. MGMT. 76, 82 (2012)
(providing a list of potential efficiencies connected with airline alliances).
374. See EC/DOT REPORT, supra note 302, at ¶ 99.
375. See id. at ¶ 8.
376. See id. at ¶¶ 99, 102.
377. See id. at ¶¶ 8, 99.
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Bilokach and Hüschelrath recently suggested granting the U.S.
antitrust immunity for only five years until the impact of the three huge
alliances can be more fully understood.378 This could be mandated by
Congress, as suggested by the late Congressman James Oberstar of
Minnesota (who favored three years).379 If the profitability of the
routes involved rises excessively with concomitant erosion of
consumer surplus, immunity could be withdrawn on one or more of
the alliances (or alliance components).380 But it bears repeating that
most of the major airlines involved in the alliances––particularly those
based outside of the U.S.––have not yet shown financial health
sustained for more than a few years.
IV. COMPETITORS FROM OUTSIDE THE ATLANTIC AREA
As recently as 1995, the U.S. and Europe accounted for 64% of
global passenger traffic. That figure was 52.3% in 2016, and it is
forecast to drop to 36% by 2036.381 The major growth markets are in
Asia and in China in particular.382 What does this portend for
international competition?
Air China is a member of the Star Alliance,383 and China Eastern
and China Southern are members of SkyTeam.384 Nevertheless,
experts have concluded that China has made a strategic decision to
protect its home market and to nurture “national champions.”385 As
familiar as that sounds as an element of industrial policy, it is hard to
translate into tangible international competitive advantage in this

378. See Volodymyr Bilotkach & Kai Hüschelrath, Antitrust Immunity for
Airline Alliances, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 335, 379 (2011).
379. See 155 CONG. REC. E179, E190 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 2009) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar).
380. The reader will recall that that the most serious antitrust issues raised by
the alliances are the joint ventures, and no more than three members participate in any
joint venture.
381. Press Release, IATA, 2036 Forecast Reveals Air Passengers Will Nearly
Double
to
7.8
Billion
(Oct.
24,
2017),
available
at
https://www.iata.org/pressroom/pr/Pages/2017-10-24-01.aspx
https://perma.cc/AE9L-CJFB].
382. See id.
383. See
Star
Alliance
Member
Airlines,
STAR ALLIANCE,
https://www.staralliance.com/en/member-airlines
[https://perma.cc/PV7X-3CA4]
(last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
384. See SKYTEAM AIRLINE ALLIANCE, https://www.skyteam.com/en/
[https://perma.cc/3EHN-JM77] (last visited Oct. 22, 2018).
385. Jiaoe Wang et al., Air Deregulation in China and Its Impact on Airline
Competition 1994–2012, 50 J. TRANSP. GEOGRAPHY 12, 12 (2016).
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industry.386 Airlines provide services that differ dramatically from
most other products and services, particularly in an international
context. They produce a service, much of which is produced and
delivered abroad employing capital equipment which, for the
foreseeable future, will be sourced for long-haul international
operations from the duopoly of Boeing and Airbus.387 International or
local markets for fuel and facilities offer no differential advantage to
the Chinese. Finally, direct labor costs for most carriers is only about
25%, and China’s ability to exploit that advantage drops with each
passing year. Chinese airlines can nonetheless provide powerful
competition throughout Asia.388
Much has been written recently about the Gulf based airlines:
Qatar, Emirates, and Etihad. Qatar joined oneworld in 2013, but Sir
Tim Clark, chairman of Emirates has decried what he sees as the
alliances’ cartel-like behavior and particularly their ability to block
routes for new members.389 These Gulf carriers are well placed to link
Asia to Europe, and their experienced European managers have
recently put price pressure on the major U.S. and EU carriers by
operating through major European hubs. This has led to accusations
386. This is not to deny that Chinese airlines can wreak havoc in East Asia
with cut-rate fares now. But if those fares reflect actual costs, they will rise
substantially with labor costs, and if they reflect subsidy, the participating airlines will
almost certainly face political and legal challenges. See Angus Whitley & Kyunghee
Park, Flying for Less Via China Deals a Blow to Global Carriers, BLOOMBERG L.
(Dec. 12, 2016, 9:11 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/articles/2016-12-12/china-s-flood-of-cheap-air-fares-deals-blow-to-globalcarriers [https://perma.cc/4U9D-KCFW].
387. See Trefor Moss, China Aircraft Exports Cleared for Takeoff Under FAA
Deal, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-aircraftexports-cleared-for-takeoff-under-faa-deal-1509947425
[https://perma.cc/BM32EUMH]. China is rising fast; it has just had a medium airliner approved by the FAA,
and, with sufficient government support, Chinese firms could produce competitive
aircraft in every range. See id. Bombardier (Canada), Embraer (Brazil), and
Mitsubishi (Japan) produce smaller regional jets that have only minor relevance to the
markets considered here. See Steven Pearlstein, Boeing and Airbus, the New ‘Super
Duopoly’, WASH. POST (Apr. 25), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2018/04/25/boeing-and-airbus-the-new-superduopoly/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.77b925bb3380
[https://perma.cc/3MXA39LP].
388. See Angus Whitley & Kyunghee Park, Chinese Airlines are Flooding the
World
with
Super-Cheap
Fares,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
12,
2016),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-12-12
[https://perma.cc/V4UQYXDD].
389. Poppy Morello, Emirates President Talks Open Skies and Airline
Subsidies, ROUTES ONLINE (May 13, 2015), https://www.routesonline.com/
news/29/breaking-news/248862/emirates-president-talks-open-skies-and-airlinesubsidies/ [https://perma.cc/N5JC-JH6W].
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of “capacity dumping” and government subsidies.390 The accusations
parallel the complaints of beleaguered domestic competitors in goods
markets.391
It appears that much of the overall competitive advantage of the
Gulf carriers lies with their new aircraft, their cultural congeniality
with many present and future travelers, and the attraction of the hub
airport locations that boast some of the greatest tourist attractions in
the Muslim world nearby.392 The Gulf carriers seem likely to put
continuing downwards pressure on transatlantic fares.

390. See Jeffrey Dastin, Changes to Gulf Open Skies Pacts Could Involve
Price, Capacity Dumping Rules—Delta CEO, REUTERS (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.reuters.com/article/airlines-competition-goals/update-1-changes-togulf-open-skies-pacts-could-involve-price-capacity-dumping-rules-delta-ceoidUSL2N0XC1K320150415 [https://perma.cc/9FCW-PPYC].
391. See THOMAS R. HOWELL & DEWEY BALLANTINE, INTERNATIONAL
FRICTION AND COOPERATION IN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRADE:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS 325 (Charles W. Wessner ed., 1997). “Dumping” in
international trade is generally regarded by economists as a non-issue unless it
involves an accusation of predatory pricing by the same standards that would apply to
a domestic competitor, and nothing more substantial than the phrase itself seems to
have emerged in airline competition. See id. at 371. The accusation of government
subsidy also appears weak; there certainly has been some government support of
various kinds, but it does not seem to have been critical. See Adam Levine-Weinberg,
Are the Gulf Airlines Competing Unfairly with U.S. Carriers?, MOTLEY FOOL (Mar.
14, 2015), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/03/14/are-the-gulf-airlinescompeting-unfairly-with-us-c.aspx [https://perma.cc/6C2G-6V9F]. Tax free or
advantaged airports support the success of the affected airlines, but historically airport
subsidies have played a major role in the U.S. and the EU as well. See Bill McGee,
How Much Do Taxpayers Support Airlines?, USA TODAY (Sept. 2, 2015),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/travel/columnist/mcgee/2015/09
/02/how-much-do-taxpayers-support-airlines/71568226/
[https://perma.cc/2P2MFW7B]; Jim Tankersley, WTO Rules Europe Illegally Subsidized Airlines, Handing
Victory to Obama Administration Ahead of Trade Fight, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/09/22/wto-rules-europeillegally-subsidized-airlines-handing-victory-to-obama-administration-ahead-oftrade-fight/?utm_term=.8320640065c1 [https://perma.cc/RPF8-4N45]. The argument
that some home market labor costs are lower than in the U.S. or the EU is no more
persuasive in this industry than in any other.
392. See generally de Wit, supra note 265 (discussing the Gulf carriers’
impact on European airlines and airports that accept their competitive advantages).
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CONCLUSION
The current transatlantic airline competition regime and, by
extension, the global regime presents a unique combination of special
government regulations and familiar competition policy challenges.
The central reality underlying the need for rough congruence in policy
lies in the extraterritoriality of antitrust jurisdiction.393 This means that
if any business practice on either side of the Atlantic has a substantial
effect on competitive conditions on the other side, authorities on either
side may intervene and either veto the practice or reach some other
accommodation.394 But based on the previous discussion, the policy
differences affecting airline operation are not very substantial and are
unlikely to generate substantial conflict. Both the U.S. and the EU, in
very different institutional contexts, seem similarly attentive to the
major barriers to effective competition in airlines.
One obvious path towards a more competitive Atlantic market
would be to allow for cabotage on both sides from airlines registered
in the U.S. and the EU. The current protectionist mood in the U.S. and
in many EU countries probably makes that a non-starter, at least for
the near future. A less extreme shift would be the relaxation of foreign
ownership restrictions, but it has yet to be demonstrated that
competition problems on either side of the Atlantic stem from
inadequate capital.395 Instead, most investors are likely wary of an
industry with such a history of red ink.
Considering the near future of competitive performance of
airlines in both the U.S. and the EU, our most optimistic scenario––
and not one we think unlikely––is that a relatively stable set of lowcost carriers will emerge in transatlantic air service that will greatly
influence the behavior of the full-service carriers. This has already
been observed within both the U.S. and EU markets separately, and
nothing now appears likely to block its development internationally.
This group seems likely to include Ryanair and EasyJet––firms with a
solid record of success in disciplining FSCs––and perhaps also
393. See GIFFORD & KUDRLE, supra note 4, at 54-55.
394. See generally id. The two most well-known cases of competition policy
conflict vividly illustrate this veto power. See id. at 54-55. In 1997 the Commission
approved the merger of two entirely U.S. firms, Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas, only
when some exclusive supply contracts were abandoned. See id. at 54. In 2001, the
Commission blocked the merger of two U.S. firms, General Electric and Honeywell,
seemingly out of fear that the combined firm would be too formidable a competitor.
See id. at 55.
395. See A NEW REGULATORY MODEL FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN AIRLINES,
WORLD ECON. F. 4 (Jan. 29, 2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/
2016/MO/WEF_AT_NewRegulatoryModel.pdf [https://perma.cc/29WK-EL24].
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Southwest, which is experimenting with international service
(although so far only to Mexico and the Caribbean). Moreover,
success with disciplining the FSCs on Atlantic routes could be the
precursor to a playing similar role on other international routes.396

396. See Miquel Ros, Low-cost Airlines: They Changed the World—but What
Next?, CNN (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/travel/article/budget-airlinetrends-2016/index.html [https://perma.cc/PG7V-DZ44]. A consideration of markets
outside of the Atlantic area lies beyond the scope of this paper. Many of the markets
are of relatively low per capita income, and the lion’s share of air travel is often
provided by low-cost carriers. See Oliver Smith, The World’s 10 Fastest-growing
Airlines are Dominated by Low-cost Carriers, TRAVELLER (Sept. 7, 2017),
http://www.traveller.com.au/the-worlds-10-fastestgrowing-airlines-are-dominatedby-lowcost-carriers-h1521d [https://perma.cc/FCJ7-V8QT]. The narrow national
experience of these carriers suggests, however, that they are poorly placed to become
international competitors serving high-income passengers.

